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Nothing New Under the Sun? A
Technologically Rational Doctrine
of Fourth Amendment Search
by Stephen E. Henderson*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In late 2002 the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency ("DARPA") launched an ill-named, if not entirely ill-advised,
data-mining initiative as part of its response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Under the direction of Vice Admiral John M.
Poindexter, infamous for his role in Iran-Contra,1 DARPA dubbed the
program "Total Information Awareness" ("TIA). The goal was to
amalgamate a mammoth database of existing commercial and governmental information, from Internet mail and calling records to banking
transactions and travel documents, which would be analyzed by a to-be
developed computer system capable of spotting suspicious behavior.2

Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law. University of California at
Davis (B.S., 1995); Yale Law School (J.D., 1999). I wish to thank Harold Krent, Andrew
Leipold, Alan Garfield, and Orin Kerr for their helpful comments on earlier drafts, and
Henry Perritt for his general encouragement of related work during my time at ChicagoKent.
1. Admiral Poindexter was National Security Advisor to President Reagan during IranContra, in which the proceeds of arms sales to Iran were used to covertly support the
contras of Nicaragua despite a Congressional directive via the Boland Amendment that
federal funds not be used for that purpose. See The Iran-ContraReport: Chronology: After
13 years of Hide-and-Seek, A Bitter Chapter of U.S. History Ends, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
1994, at A8.
2. John Markoff, Threats and Responses: Intelligence: Pentagon Plans a Computer
System That Would Peek at PersonalData of Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at A12;
Robert O'Harrow Jr., U.S. Hopes to Check Computer Globally: System Would Be Used to
Hunt Terrorists, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 12, 2002, at A4. There is disagreement on
whether the goal is technically feasible. See id.; John Markoff & John Schwartz,
*
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As the brainchild of an office whose motto was "Scientia Est Potentia"
("Knowledge is Power"), the Orwellian connotations of TIA did not go
unheeded.3 In the words of critic William Safire,
Every purchase you make with a credit card, every magazine subscription you buy and medical prescription you fill, every Web site you visit
and e-mail you send or receive, every academic grade you receive, every
bank deposit you make, every trip you book and every event you
attend-all these transactions and communications will go into what
the Defense Department describes as "a virtual, centralized grand
database." To this computerized dossier on your private life from
commercial sources, add every piece of information that government
has about you-passport application, driver's license and bridge toll
records, judicial and divorce records, complaints from nosy neighbors
to the F.B.I., your lifetime paper trail plus the latest hidden camera
surveillance-and you have the supersnoop's dream:
a "Total
4
Information Awareness" about every U.S. citizen.
As a result of such libertarian concern and aggravated by the choice
of Admiral Poindexter to lead the program, Congress ultimately
legislated not only TIA's demise, but that of the entire office that
spawned the initiative.5 This will not be the last word, however. Even

Technology: Many Tools of Big Brother Are Now Up and Running, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,
2002, at C1.
3. See William Safire, You Are a Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A35. DARPA
formed the Information Awareness Office ("IAO") to develop new surveillance technologies
in response to the attacks of 9/11. See Markoff, Threats, supra note 2. The choice of the
ominous moniker "Total Information Awareness" demonstrates a rather remarkable failure
to learn from the FBI's decision to dub its electronic surveillance capability "Carnivore."
Although allegedly named to demonstrate its selectivity because a carnivore eats only the
meat, the name was, unsurprisingly, a public-relations disaster. Following significant and
sustained civil libertarian interest and ire, the FBI finally changed the name to the
admirably bland DCS-1000 ("digital collection system"). See John Schwartz, Bin Laden
Inquiry Was Hindered by F.B.I. E-Mail Tapping, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at A16.
DARPA similarly belatedly changed the name of its program to "Terrorism Information
Awareness," as well as removed an emblem for IAO that featured "a human eye, embedded
in the peak of a pyramid, scanning the globe." Ariana Eunjung Cha, PentagonDetailsNew
Surveillance System, WASHINGTON POST, May 21, 2003, at A6; John Markoff, Poindexter's
Still a Technocrat, Still a Lightning Rod, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at C1.
4. Safire, You Are a Suspect, supra note 3. For his humorous response to his own
critics, see William Safire, Privacy Invasion Curtailed,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at A41.
5. Carl Hulse, CongressShuts Pentagon Unit Over Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,2003,
at A20; Markoff, Poindexter'sStill a Technocrat, supra note 3. A majority of states have
also backed out of a similar state initiative dubbed MATRIX (Multi-State Anti-Terrorism
Information Exchange). See John Schwartz, Privacy Fears Erode Support For a Network
to Fight Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2004, at C1.
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now much of the TIA framework continues under other names in other
agencies, and private entities are hard at work gathering data for
similar private initiatives. 6 In the words of Admiral Poindexter, "It's
very important that this research be continued. I think it eventually
will be. I'm an optimist."7
While databases such as TIA are only one of many significant threats
to privacy and information security in the twenty-first century s the
concept of TIA (merely collecting what was voluntarily provided to third
parties) and the strident and swift political response (against a database
in which we would all be included) have lessons for how we should think
about the Fourth Amendment9 in a world of amazing but intrusive
technology. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures" is only relevant to certain activity. When

6. See Audrey Hudson, Government's Pursuit of PersonalData Lives On: Pentagon
Program Closed, But Others in Development, WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at Al;
Markoff & Schwartz, Many Tools of Big Brother, supra note 2 (describing aspects of TIA
already in place); Michael Moss & Ford Fessenden, America Under Surveillance: Privacy
and Security: New Tools for Domestic Spying, and Qualms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at
Al (describing some other government data mining programs); Duane D. Stanford, All Our
Lives are on File for Sale, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 21, 2004, at IA (describing private
sector initiatives); Leslie Walker, New Services are Minding Your Business, WASHINGTON

POST, Mar. 4, 2004, at El (describing private sector initiatives). For a 71 page GAO report
on U.S. government data mining, see U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Data Mining: Federal
Efforts Cover a Wide Range of Uses, availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04548.pdf.
For a commentary on that report see Eric J. Sinrod, What's Up with Government Data
Mining?, USA TODAY, availableat www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/ericjsinrod/2004-06-

09-sinrodx.htm.
7. Bob Keefe, PoindexterOptimistic That his SurveillancePlan Will Return: Pentagon's
Program to MonitorAmericans was Scrapped Amid Privacy Concerns, AUSTIN AMERICANSTATESMAN, Apr. 21, 2004, at A8.
8. We are increasingly subject to surveillance, both online and off. See Linda
Rosencrance, Information Highway Patrol: It's 11 a.m.-Do You Know What Your
Employees are Doing?, COMPUTERWORLD, May 31, 2004, availableat http://www.computer
world.com/printthis/2004/0,4814,93471,00.html; Doug Bedell, Got the Funny Feeling
Someone's Watching? You may be Right to Wonder Who's Keeping Tabs, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 14, 2001, at IF; David McGuire, Virginia Beach Installs Face-Recognition
Cameras, WASHINGTON POST, July 3, 2002, at http://www/washingtonpost.com/acl/

wpayn/Al9946-2002J.13; Jeffrey Rosen, A Watchful State, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, at 38;
Jess Bravin, Washington Police Play "I Spy," WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. The Fourth Amendment provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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employers and other private individuals conduct surveillance, or ask us
to trade our privacy for a perk," the Fourth Amendment is not
implicated. 12 If the government desires to commit a similar intrusion
into our privacy, but we consent, the Amendment provides no restraint. 13 But even outside these longstanding limitations, a real risk
exists that Supreme Court jurisprudence defining a "search" may render
the Amendment increasingly irrelevant.
The Fourth Amendment is only implicated when the government
invades our "reasonable expectation of privacy." 4 According to the
Supreme Court, we retain no reasonable expectation of privacy in what
we knowingly expose to the public.' 5 As technology dictates that more
and more information regarding our personal lives is available to anyone
equipped to receive it, and as social norms dictate that more and more
information is provided to third parties, this restriction threatens to
render the Fourth Amendment a practical nullity. The current
definition of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search was crafted
in light of one developing technology, the telephone networks. Now is
the time to craft a definition that accommodates the amazing but
intrusive technologies of the twenty-first century.
This Article will first review the genesis of the "reasonable expectation
of privacy" ("REP") requirement, both to establish the governing legal

11. See, e.g., Bedell, Got the Funny Feeling, supra note 8; Your Staff are the Weakest
Link, COMPUTING, May 6, 2004, available at 2004 WL 62911377 (describing non-scientific
study in which approximately three-quarters of those asked were willing to provide their
passwords for a chocolate bar); Mike Musgrove, Search Is On for Gmail Names,
WASHINGTON POST, May 21, 2004, at El (describing widespread willingness to pay for a
desirable address on a forthcoming free e-mail service despite its content being monitored
for advertising purposes); Tom W. Bell, Internet Privacy and Self-Regulation: Lessons from
the Porn Wars, 65 CATO INSTITUTE BRIEFING PAPER, Aug. 9, 2001, at 3 (describing the
disconnect between Internet users alleged concern for privacy and their actions); Go on,
Watch me: People are Voluntarily SurrenderingTheir Privacy, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2003,
at 12.
12. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
This Court has also consistently construed this [Fourth Amendment] protection
as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable to a search or
seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as
an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any
governmental official.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). "It is .. . well settled
that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of [the Fourth
Amendment] is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." Id. (citing Davis v. United
States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946)).
14. Id. at 277.
15. See Section III, infra.
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framework and to demonstrate how changing technology has altered our
conception of the Fourth Amendment search in the past. This includes
the "third party cases," in which the Supreme Court articulated and
developed the doctrine that one retains no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information provided to a third party.
This Article then examines a pressing and undecided issue that helps
to frame the need for doctrinal clarification, namely whether there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic mail in unencrypted and
encrypted form. This analysis and an examination of several developed
and developing technologies, make clear that the "third party doctrine"
must be strictly construed if the Fourth Amendment is to meaningfully
limit government intrusions. "Knowing exposure" should not remove
information from the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but rather
only affirmative desire that content be utilized by a third party. This
will avoid the dangerous incentive effect in which those very searches
receiving little to no Fourth Amendment protection are also becoming
cheaper to perform.
With the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine so limited, or even
jettisoned altogether in favor of a dictionary definition of "search," courts
can properly turn their focus to what intrusions are "reasonable." This
Article concludes by examining three potential guideposts in this
determination: government need, political process checks, and use
limitations.
II.

FROM OLMSTEAD TO KATZ-THE GENESIS OF THE "REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY"

Olmstead v. United States"6 came before the Supreme Court during
Prohibition in 1928. Although Prohibition itself was relatively shortlived, at least as a national policy,1 7 the issue confronted by the Court
remains contentious-how should the Fourth Amendment's prohibition
against "unreasonable searches and seizures" be applied to novel
technologies not available to, and perhaps not even conceivable to, the
Framers."8

16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17. Prohibition, ushered in by the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution (1919),
was repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933. Some states, however, maintained
their prohibition laws until the 1960s. See "Prohibition," WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA (1999).
18. For an excellent discussion of this general topic, see Lawrence Lessig, Reading the
Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996). That the Supreme Court only
addressed the issue of wiretapping telephone conversations in 1928, some 50 years after
the invention of the telephone, makes it unsurprising that the application of the Fourth
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The criminal scheme in Olmstead was of "amazing magnitude,"
involving the importation and sale of liquor on a massive scale.19 Over
seventy individuals were indicted, including Roy Olmstead, who acted
as "general manager" and received half of the operation's profits. An
operation of this scale required ample means of communication, which
were provided via telephone. Three lines led into the organization's
main office, at which someone was always present to take orders, and
Olmstead and his co-conspirators also placed and received calls from
their respective residences.2 °
Federal agents obtained much of their evidence from this relatively
state-of-the-art communications system. The agents tapped the lines
running from the residences and the main office.
While these taps
could have been conducted within the boundaries of defendants'
property, none of them were. The residential taps were made in the
streets near the homes, and the taps for the office lines were
made in a
22
basement in which defendants had no property interest.
Based on the Fourth Amendment language protecting "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,"23
the Court stated "[t]he amendment itself shows that the search is to be
of material things-the person, the house, his papers, or his effects."24
This language easily encompasses some modes of communication, such

Amendment to many current technologies remains undecided. The wheels ofjustice often
turn slowly, which some have argued is reason to turn to Congress rather than judicial
interpretation of the Constitution when technology interacts with privacy. See Orin S.
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in New Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths & the Case for
Restraint, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801-88 (2004). Ultimately, however, it is the duty of the
courts to say what the law is, especially when it comes to interpreting the Constitution.
19. 277 U.S. at 455-56.
It involved the employment of not less than 50 persons, of two sea-going vessels
for the transportation of liquor to British Columbia, of smaller vessels for
coastwise transportation to the state of Washington, the purchase and use of a
branch beyond the suburban limits of Seattle, with a large underground cache for
storage and a number of smaller caches in that city, the maintenance of a central
office manned with operators, and the employment of executives, salesman,
deliverymen dispatchers, scouts, bookkeepers, collectors, and an attorney. In a
bad month sales amounted to $176,000; the aggregate for a year must have
exceeded $2,000,000.
Id. at 456. It enjoyed the assistance of some members of the Seattle police. Id. at 457.
20. Id. at 456-57.
21. Id. Monitoring of these phone lines was extensive. It extended over a period of
nearly five months, and agents' typewritten record of the substance of monitored
conversations reached 775 pages in length. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 457.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
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as a letter sent via the United States Post Office because "[t]he letter is
a paper, an effect."25 In the opinion of the Court, however, it was
equally clear that this language did not encompass the mode of
communication at issue, namely the transmission of the human voice via
an analog electronic signal.26 The Court stated, "The amendment does
not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
seizure. The evidence
27
and that only."

The outcome may have been different had the tapping of the phone
lines been accomplished via entry onto the defendants' property, and
hence threatened the security of their "houses."2' Here, there was no
such entry, and according to the Court,
[t]he language of the amendment cannot be extended and expanded to
include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house
or office, any more than are the highways along which they are
stretched .... [Conversations] passing over [telephone wires] are not
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.2 9
Thus, the Court adopted what has come to be termed the "propertybased" or "trespass-based" conception of the Fourth Amendment: if there
was no encroachment on a defendant's property interest, there could be
no violation of the Fourth Amendment.3 °
Fearing that the Court had overlooked the necessity of adapting
constitutional guarantees to a changing world, Justice Brandeis, in
dissent, presciently worried that "[w]ays may some day be developed by

25. Id. (discussing Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), which held that the Fourth
Amendment protects sealed letters released to the United States Postal Service for
delivery).
26. Id. at 465.
27. Id. at 464.
28. See id. (emphasizing that "[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of the
defendants"). Even had there been some trespass, Olmstead may not have prevailed,
however, based on the Court's characterization of an earlier decision as holding that
despite a trespass, there was no search when government agents merely utilize their sense
of hearing. Id. at 465 (describing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924)).
29. Id. at 465-66.
30. Id. at 466.
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to
our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a
defendant, unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or
such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects or an actual physical
invasion of his house "or curtilage" for the purpose of making a seizure.
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which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose
to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home."3 1 Although some
of Justice Brandeis's concerns were perhaps unrealistic, 2 technological
developments since 1928 have given continued credence to his basic
assertion that "Idliscovery and invention have made it possible for the
government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack,
to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet."3 3
Despite Justice Brandeis's impassioned and eloquent dissent,34 the
property-based conception advanced in Olmstead remained persuasive
to a majority of the Court. The contours of that doctrine are demonstrated by two subsequent decisions. In Goldman v. United States,35 federal
agents had access to the office space adjoining the office of one of the
defendants.3" In order to overhear conversations occurring within the
defendant's office, agents entered his office without his knowledge and
installed a listening device that was wired into the adjacent space
through the connecting wall. When that device failed to operate,
however, the agents instead relied on a "detectaphone," a device that,
when placed on the agent's side of the wall, was able to detect and

31. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justices Holmes, Butler, and Stone also
dissented. See id. at 469 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 485 (Butler, J., dissenting); id. at
488 (Stone, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Taft delivered the majority opinion.
32. Justice Brandeis posited that '[aidvances in the psychic and related sciences may
bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions." Id. at 474
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
34. His dissent includes this famous passage:
[I]t is also immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement.
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert
to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis concluded with these words:
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become
a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of
the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely
set its face.
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
35. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
36. Id. at 131. The three defendants were attorneys convicted for conspiring to defraud
creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 130-31.
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amplify the sound waves resulting from the conversation taking place in
the adjoining room.3"
Based on the reasoning from Olmstead, the use of the listening device
might have violated the Fourth Amendment because it had been
installed via a trespass. The Court, however, did not have to reach this
issue because the device was inoperable and, therefore, never used. As
to the detectaphone, there was no trespass to any protected space, and
there was no examination of any person, paper, or effect. Hence no
search occurred for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.3"
In Silverman v. United States,39 the police again eavesdropped
through a party wall. This time, however, they used a "spike mike," a
microphone which penetrated a few inches through the wall and came
to rest against the ducting of the defendant's home.4" Although the
court below had followed Goldman, refusing to draw a distinction based
on such a minute intrusion, the Supreme Court was not similarly
persuaded. 4 The Court stated the "decision here.., is based upon the
reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area ....
We find no occasion to re-examine Goldman here, but we decline to go
beyond it, by even a fraction of an inch."42
While Silverman was in one sense a straightforward application of the
property-based conception, it was also a departure from Olmstead's
insistence that the examination of a tangible object was required to
The arbitrariness of the Court's remaining
constitute a search.43
bright-line rule did not go unnoticed. Justice Douglas, in concurrence,
questioned the results of Goldman and Silverman when "the invasion of

37. Id. at 131.
38. Id. at 134-36. The Court had no desire to reconsider Olmstead:
That case was the subject of prolonged consideration by this [C]ourt. The views
of the [C]ourt, and of the dissenting justices, were expressed clearly and at length.
To rehearse and reappraise the arguments pro and con, and the conflicting views
exhibited in the opinions, would serve no good purpose. Nothing now can be
profitably added to what was there said.
Id. at 135-36. Two justices in dissent agreed with this premise. Justice Murphy added a
substantive dissent largely mirroring that of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead. See id. at 13642 (Murphy, J., dissenting). See id. at 136 (Stone, C.J. and Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
39. 365 U.S. 505 (1960).
40. Id. at 506-07. The defendants were operating an illegal gambling operation. Id.
at 506.
41. Id. at 512.
42. Id.
43. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) (noting the demise of this aspect
of Olmstead). Justice Harlan would also note this divergence in his concurrence in Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361-62 (1967), described infra note 55. Justice Black's
dissent in that case is a lucid defense of the original Olmstead position. See id. at 364-74.
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privacy is as great in one case as in the other."" Six years later in
Katz v. United States,4 5 Olmstead's conception would suffer its final
demise.
In Katz law enforcement once again sought to use technology to obtain
evidence, this time by placing an electronic listening device, or "bug," on
the outside of a public telephone booth.46 The Ninth Circuit, following
Olmstead, Goldman, and Silverman, concluded that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because "there was no physical entrance into the
area occupied by [Katz]. " " Even such an intrusion would be of no
import if a public telephone booth was not a protected space. Therefore,
the first of Katz's questions presented before the Supreme Court asked
48
whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area.
The Court "decline[d] to adopt this formulation," speaking as if Katz
should have known better: "In the first place, the correct solution of
Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation
of the phrase 'constitutionally protected area.'"49
Magnanimously, the Court was able to disregard the "misleading way
the issues [had] been formulated," explaining that "this effort to decide
whether or not a given 'area,' viewed in the abstract, is 'constitutionally
protected' deflects attention from the problem presented by this case.
5°
For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." Surely this
would have come as a surprise to Olmstead and Goldman, but the Court
held that those cases were no longer good law: "the reach of [the Fourth]
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure."5

44. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512-13 (Douglas, J., concurring).
45. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
46. Id. at 348. Like in Silverman, Katz was engaged in illegal gambling, here in
violation of the federal Wire Wager Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961). Id.
47. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966).
48. Id. at 133.

49. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
50. Id. at 351.
51. Id. at 353. The Court asserted that "the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman
have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there
There was intervening
enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling." Id.
precedent, such as the decision of Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304
(1967), which stated "[tihe premise that property interests control the right of the
Government to search and seize has been discredited." Id. But that language was used
in a different context, the seizure of mere evidence, and the decision was handed down only
months before Katz was argued. It was certainly not unexpected, and seemingly not
unreasonable, for Katz to have relied on the directly analogous precedent of Goldman and
Silverman, despite the Court's implications to the contrary. And as Justice Harlan
explained in his concurring opinion, the place intruded upon is still very relevant: "As the
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Unfortunately, the Court did not clearly articulate a new test to
replace the property-based conception, stating only that "[tihe Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."5 2 Thus, the
test for what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "search" instead comes
from Justice Harlan's concurrence: "[T]here is a twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable."'5 3 Because the first requirement is often
difficult to determine and is subject to government manipulation-for
example a law enforcement announcement that all homes will hereafter
be subject to random inspections-the second requirement has become
54
determinative.

Court's opinion states, 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.' The question,
however, is what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to
that question requires reference to a 'place.'" Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
Justice Harlan succinctly noted that "[Goldman's] limitation on Fourth Amendment
protection is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable
expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion." Id. at
362.
52. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. The Court did go on to hold that the search and seizure were
unconstitutional absent judicial authorization. See id. at 354-59.
53. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Despite the majority's failure to clearly
articulate a new test, both elements of this test can be found in its opinion. See Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)
("The first [question] is whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy-whether, in the words of the Katz
majority, the individual has shown that 'he seeks to preserve (something) as
private.' The second question is whether the individual's subjective expectation
of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable-whether, in
the words of the Katz majority, the individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is
'justifiable' under the circumstances").
Id. (internal citations omitted).
54. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978);
Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384
(1974). The Court seems to indiscriminately waffle between phrasing the requirement a
"reasonable" expectation of privacy and a "legitimate" expectation of privacy, leaving
uncertain whether the test is meant to be empirical, as suggested by the former term, or
normative, as suggested by the latter. See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 740, 743-44 (using both
terms interchangeably). See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 219 n.4 (1986).
In Justice Harlan's classic description, an actual expectation of privacy is entitled
to Fourth Amendment protection if it is an expectation that society recognizes as
"reasonable." Since Katz, our decisions also have described constitutionally
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Thus in 1928 when the Supreme Court first encountered the relatively
novel technology of telephone wiretapping, it held the practice did not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search. At that time approximately
forty-one percent of U.S. households were equipped with telephone
service."5 But by 1967, when eighty-seven percent of households were
so equipped,5 6 the Court, influenced by the increasing prevalence and
importance of the telephone in society, reversed course:
[A] person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him,
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to
ignore the vital role that
57 the public telephone has come to play in
private communication.
That technology should inform what constitutes a Fourth Amendment
search is therefore not novel.58 The remaining question, which is a
hard one, is precisely what that effect should be.
III.

THE "THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE"

In order to understand how the reasonable expectation of privacy
("REP") criterion of Katz applies to modern technology, it is necessary to
examine a second line of cases in which the Supreme Court developed
what can be termed the "third party doctrine." The first of these cases,
Hoffa v. United States,59 was decided a year before Katz.

protected privacy interests as those that society regards as "legitimate," using the
words "reasonable" and "legitimate" interchangeably.
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
55. U.S. Census Bureau, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 2003, No. HS-42,
Selected Communications Media: 1920 to 2001, at http://www.census.gov/statab/histl

HS42.pdf. Even the President -ofthe United States did not have a telephone at his desk
until 1929.

Webb & Associates, Telecommunications History Timeline: The 1920s, at

http://www.webbconsult.com/1920.html.
56.

Webb & Assoc., Telecommunications History Timeline: The 1920s, at www.webb

consult.com/1920.html.
57. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
58. The proposition is not, however, without its critics. See, e.g., id. at 364-74 (Black,
J., dissenting).
59. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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Notorious labor leader James ("Jimmy") Hoffa 6' and his co-defendants were convicted for their attempts to bribe members of a criminal
jury.6 1 Perhaps the most damning testimony was that of Edward Partin,
a fellow Teamster who testified to his conversations with Hoffa and a codefendant and who had acted as an informant to the government while
events were unfolding.6 2
Partin's assistance was not motivated by altruism; he was facing state
and federal indictments of his own, and he had been in contact with
federal agents prior to his initial meeting with Hoffa. Following his
service, Partin's wife received $1200 in government funds and the
pending criminal charges against him were never pursued." The Court
accepted that Partin was a government agent prior to his first meeting
Hoffa
with Hoffa and that he was compensated for that service.'
the use of such a "secret informer" violated the Fourth
argued that 65
Amendment.

The Court held otherwise: "Neither this Court nor any member of it
has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a
wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it .... [N]o right protected by

the Fourth Amendment was violated in [this] case."6 Although Hoffa
was decided before Katz, and therefore, before the REP test definitively
replaced the property-based conception, the Court reiterated the doctrine
in United States v.White, a similar "false friend" case. 67 Thus, despite

60. Hoffa became president of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters in 1957.
Imprisoned in 1968 for the charges discussed infra note 67, he was released in 1971 when
President Nixon commuted his sentence. In 1975 he disappeared, presumably having been
murdered. See "Hoffa, James Riddle," WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (1999).
61. The jury was empanelled to decide whether James Hoffa had violated the TaftHartley Act. The case ended in a hung jury. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 294.
62. Id. at 295.
63. Id. at 297-98. At least some of these pending charges were serious, including
embezzlement, kidnapping, and manslaughter. See id. at 317-18 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
In Chief Justice Warren's opinion, the payments were made to his wife in order to
obfuscate their true source. See id. at 319 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 299. The government claimed the payment was merely reimbursement for
Partin's out-of-pocket costs, and the failure to pursue charges against Partin had no
necessary relation to his assistance. Id. at 298. Although the lower courts found ample
support for these contentions, the Supreme Court chose to presume Partin was a
government mole, presumably because that was the best scenario for the defendants, but
it still proved unavailing. See id.
65. Id. at 295. Hoffa also alleged violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
Id. at 295, 309-10.
66. Id. at 302-03.
67. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Although there was no majority opinion in White, the Court
determined there is no Fourth Amendment violation when an informant wears a wire that
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obtaining the same information that might otherwise be obtained via a
bug, which would constitute a Fourth Amendment search according to
Katz, there is no protection from false friends.
The third party doctrine was further elucidated in United States v.
Miller 9 and Smith v. Maryland."° Recognizing the desirability of
banking records for government investigations, the Bank Secrecy Act of
197071 required banks to maintain records of customer transactions.72
When federal agents obtained Mitchell Miller's records via grand jury
subpoena, Miller moved to suppress the evidence for violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights.7" Despite the fact that banks were required
to preserve this information, and that Miller had no choice but to
surrender the information to the bank in order to transact business
there, the Court found the third party doctrine controlling: "[Miller] had
74
no protectable Fourth Amendment interest in the. . . documents." As
in Hoffa and White, a "depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs
to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government."75
In Smith the Court returned to the telephone network. When the
victim of a robbery began to receive obscene and harassing phone calls,
apparently from the perpetrator, police requested that the telephone
company place a pen register on the suspect's home phone line. That
device recorded all phone numbers dialed from the defendant's residence,

contemporaneously transmits his conversations to agents. See id. at 746-47,754. Arguably
the Court also reaffirmed the "false friend" doctrine in Katz itself: "What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (internal
citations omitted).
68. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 314.
69. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
70. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
71. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-36 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959; 18 U.S.C. § 6002; 31 U.S.C. §§ 321,
5311-5314, 5316-5322).
72. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 436, 442-43.
73. Id. at 437. The government used the bank records in its prosecution against Miller
for failure to pay required taxes on the manufacture of alcohol. Id. at 436.
74. Id. at 437.
75. Id. at 443. The Court went on to reiterate that
[tihis Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the
third party will not be betrayed.
Id. (citing, inter alia, White and Hoffa).
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thus, verifying that he was the caller of interest.7" The Court held that
a caller has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed
from his or her home telephone, and therefore, that no Fourth Amendment search had taken place.77 According to the Court, any subjective
expectation of privacy would be unreasonable because a telephone
customer, like anyone else, "has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."7"
IV.

ELECTRONIC MAIL

Electronic mail ("e-mail") has rapidly become a familiar form of
communication for business and pleasure, despite its potential insecurities.79 While as recently as the year 2000 only approximately forty-six
percent of adult Americans were online, today at least sixty-three
percent are online." Although not yet as universal as the telephone in

76. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
77. Id. at 743-45. The Court also concluded it was unlikely that the defendant had any
subjective expectation of privacy in the information, given that customers know phone
company equipment requires the number to route the call, that the phone company makes
a record of at least some numbers dialed (toll calls), and because most customers know that
the phone company can generally assist in tracing obscene or harassing callers. Id. at 74243.
78. Id. at 743-44. For more contemporary variations on this theme, see Michael Moss
& Ford Fessenden, America Under Surveillance: Privacy and Security: New Tools for
Domestic Spying, and Qualms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at Al (describing FBI efforts to
identify every person who had taken diving lessons in the previous three years via dive
shop records after becoming concerned that terrorists might attack using scuba gear);
Philip Shenon & John Scwartz, JetBlue Target of Inquiries By 2 Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 2003, at C1 (describing JetBlue Airways' revelation that it had provided travel records
For other examples of what is deemed
on passengers to a Pentagon contractor).
"voluntarily turn[ed] over" see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973) (holding
taking of voice exemplar does not constitute a search; stating same for facial characteristics
and handwriting); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22 (1973) (handwriting exemplar).
79. See Katie Hafner, Billions Served Daily, and Counting, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001,
at G1 (according to one estimate 9.8 billion e-mails are sent each day); Steve Lohr, Off the
Shelf. A Management Revolution Still in the Making, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, § 3, at 5
(noting that "the average American office worker receives [thirty-six] email messages a day,
seven times more than voicemail").
80. Pew Internet & American Life Project, Usage Over Time, available at http://www.
pewinternet.org/trends.asp#demographics. Of those accessing the Internet, almost all (from
91-95%) utilize e-mail. Id. According to the Census Bureau, approximately 42% of
American households had Internet Access in the year 2000. Eric C. Newburger, Home
Computers and Internet Use in the United States: August 2000, U.S. CENsUs BUREAU,
available at www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p23-207.pdf.
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1967, e-mail is becoming universal at a much more rapid pace."' In the
words of Chief Justice Rehnquist,
[tlechnology now permits millions of important and confidential
conversations to occur through a vast system of electronic networks.
These advances, however, raise significant privacy concerns. We are
placed in the uncomfortable position of not knowing who might have
access to our personal and business e-mails, our medical and financial
records, or our cordless and cellular telephone conversations.82
Despite this well-known threat, most courts have yet to determine
whether the sender of e-mail retains a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of the message. An examination of how the REP doctrine
applies to e-mail demonstrates an ambiguity in the third party doctrine
that has significant ramifications for technologically-enhanced searches.
The Technology of E-mail

A.

For our purposes, a rather rudimentary understanding of e-mail will
suffice. 3 Say Bob, who has an account with the Internet Service
Provider ("ISP") Earthlink and the e-mail address bob@earthlink.net,
wants to send a message to Alice, who has an account with AT&T and
the e-mail address alice@att.net. Bob will first draft the message with
his e-mail client of choice (e.g., Microsoft Outlook or Eudora), which will
then "send" the message.8 4 Because the Internet is a packet-switched
network, Bob's message will be divided up into multiple packets if it is
lengthy.8 5 This does not fundamentally alter our analysis, however, so
we will presume Bob's e-mail will travel as a single packet.86 Just as
with postal mail, Bob's message could not reach Alice if her address were

81. It was not until 1945 that forty-six percent of American households were equipped
with telephone service. U.S. Census Bureau, StatisticalAbstract, supra note 58.
82. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 523 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, chided the Court for recognizing a First
Amendment exception to statutory wiretap restrictions).
83. For a complete description of the technology of e-mail see JAMES F. KuROSE &
KEITH W. Ross, COMPUTER NETWORKING: A TOP-DOWN

APPROACH FEATURING THE

INTERNET 106-24 (2001).

84.

Perhaps a more technically proper term for "email client" is "user agent." See id.

at 107-08.
85. See id. at 18-20.

86. This would always be true in a message-switched network. See id. at 20-21. While
it is theoretically possible that different packets (portions) of the same message will travel
different routes to their ultimate destination, as a practical matter this is unlikely, and
either way it is not crucial to our analysis. See id. at 275. Each packet contains the
information necessary to route it to its ultimate destination, where the entire message will
be reassembled. See id. at 24.
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not included. Therefore, Bob's computer will append the required
addressing information to his message.
The manner in which Bob's message will travel to the mail server at
his ISP depends on the technology he uses to access the Internet. If he
uses a dial-up connection over the plain old telephone system ("POTS"),
his modem will convert the digital voltage states of his computer to an
analog-encoded digital signal that can travel over the telephone line."8
If Bob uses DSL, his more sophisticated modem will do the same.89 If
he uses a cable broadband connection, Bob's cable modem will route the
signal to the local head end, from where it will travel to the mail
server.90 If he is at an office with a local area network ("LAN"), an
Ethernet modem will probably send the data on its way. 1 Regardless
of the technology, the result is the same-Bob's message will make its
way to Earthlink's mail server.
That server will send the message on its way to AT&T's mail server;
from there it will be up to AT&T to deliver the content to Alice.92 The
Internet is a vast network of networks, each linked via some means of
communication, be it copper wire, fiber optic cable, or radio transmission.9 3 Earthlink's server will not have a direct connection to AT&T.
Instead, Earthlink will send the message to an intermediate system that
puts the message "closer" to its destination; that system will send the
message to another intermediate system "closer" to its destination, and
this process will continue until the message ultimately reaches the mail
server owned by AT&T. 4 The routing algorithms that determine the
path Bob's message will take through the "Internet cloud" are fascinating and complicated, but beyond our scope.95 But the message will take
some sequence of "hops" from one system to the next until it reaches
AT&T.
So who has access to Bob's message? Obviously Bob's ISP, Earthlink,
and Alice's ISP, AT&T, have access. But these are not all; every system
through which Bob's message travels could access its content. Bob has

87. See id. at 24.
88. Id. at 30-31.
89. Id. at 31-32.
90. Id. at 32-33.
91. Id. at 33-34.
92. The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) will be used to communicate the
message between the mail servers, while either the Post Office Protocol-Version 3 (POP3)
or the Internet Mail Access Protocol (IMAP) will be used to retrieve the message from
AT&T's mail server. See id. at 109-11, 118-22.
93. See id. at 1-4, 34-38.
94. See id. at 3.
95. See id. at 321-31.
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absolutely no way of knowing which systems these will be or who will
own them. In fact, because routing is dependent upon current traffic,
nobody, could know which systems these will be. Bob only knows that
his message will ultimately make its way to AT&T, from whom Alice will
obtain it.
B.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

According to the third party doctrine, Bob has voluntarily given his
message to any number of persons, and therefore could be said to have
no reasonable expectation of privacy ("REP") in that message. If so, the
government could access the e-mail without Fourth Amendment
restriction not only from Earthlink or AT&T, but also from any
intermediate system through which the message passed that happened
to retain a copy. Although this leaves absolutely no Fourth Amendment
protection for a critical means of communication, such a holding would
not be without precedent.
While there is scant law on the Fourth Amendment's application to email, the military courts have considered the issue on several occasions."
In United States v. Maxwell," an Air Force officer was
convicted by general court-martial based on the content of e-mails he
sent to and received from other AOL users.9
The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces held that Maxwell possessed a REP in email messages on the AOL system, but only because the messages never
left AOL's proprietary network and AOL contractually guaranteed their
privacy.99 In the words of the court, "AOL differs from other systems,
specifically the Internet .... [T]he Internet has a less secure e-mail

96. One plausible reason for the paucity of law is the statutory protection provided to
electronic communications, including e-mail, under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102522 (2000), and under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2000).
Because suppression of evidence is not a remedy under either Act, however, it remains
surprising that more defendants do not invoke the Fourth Amendment. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2515 (1968) (providing exclusionary remedy only for wire or oral communications); 18
U.S.C. §§ 2707 (2002), 2708 (1986) (not providing for suppression). An impetus for
statutory protection was a Department of Justice opinion that one may not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail. See S. Rep. 99-541, 3-4; 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3557-58. Because of the storing and forwarding technology of e-mail, however, it may
not receive any meaningful protection under the Wiretap Act. See United States v.
Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 201-04 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding any e-mail in "electronic storage"
as defined by the Stored Communications Act is not governed by the Wiretap Act).
97. 45 M.J. 406 (Crim. App. 1996).
98. Id. at 410, 417.
99. Id. at 417.
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system, in which messages must pass through a series of computers in
order to reach the intended recipient."'0 0
In United States v. Monroe,'' Staff Sergeant Monroe used an e-mail
account provided by the military. When personnel charged with
administering that network perused his e-mail, Monroe alleged a
violation of the Fourth Amendment."' The same military court found
no REP: "Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that
Monroe had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mail messages
or e-mail box at least from the personnel charged with maintaining the
military court
[network]."01 3 In United States v. Geter,'14 a 10lower
5
followed Maxwell and Monroe and found no REP.
In both Monroe and Geter, the service provider, the United States
government, actively denied any expectation of privacy for reasons of
military order.'0 6 But the reasoning of Maxwell is not so limited, nor
did the court in Geter so limit its holding. The defendant in Geter
argued that e-mail should be treated analogously to postal mail, thus
urging the court to follow the longstanding Supreme Court precedent
that the sender of postal mail retains a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of a sealed mailing. 10 7 The court rejected the proffered
analogy based on the following circumstance.' ° When Geter's message
was sent via electronic mail a copy was retained despite the transmission having been completed, and only that copy was accessed.'
The court could just as easily have cited the fact that those transmitting e-mail along its path need not tear open a physical envelope to read

100. Id. Whether the court had a solid understanding of the technology is questionable,
but the implications for e-mails that do traverse the Internet is clear.
101. 52 M.J. 326 (Crim. App. 1999).
102. Id. at 327-28.
103. Id. at 330. Monroe had knowingly received pornography, including several
depictions of child pornography and several depictions that were obscene. See id. at 329.
104. 2003 WL 21254249, *1 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App. 2003) (unpublished).
105. Id. at *3. Geter, a member of the United States Marine Corps, had used his
government e-mail account to send messages in furtherance of a conspiracy to distribute
controlled substances. Id. at *1.
106. In Monroe defendant encountered a banner upon every login: "USERS LOGGING
ONTO THIS SYSTEM CONSENT TO MONITORING BY THE HOSTADM." Monroe, 52
M.J. at 328. At least one other court has held similarly with respect to the content of a
police department network. See generally Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D.
Nev. 1996).
107. Geter, 2003 WL 21254249, at *5. The Supreme Court concluded a reasonable
expectation of privacy existed in sealed postal mail in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733
(1877).
108. Geter, 2003 WL 21254249, at *5.
109. See id.
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its contents. Perhaps this distinction is what lead the Eighth Circuit to
state that "[w]hile it is clear to this court that Congress intended to
create a statutory expectation of privacy in e-mail files, it is less clear
that an analogous expectation of privacy derives from the Constitution."11° But surely such a technological fortuity should not govern the
Fourth Amendment. In his dissent in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis
argued that telephone calls should be treated like postal mail,' an
argument the Court has come to accept." 2 Brandeis's argument
applies just as forcefully to e-mail:
In Ex parte Jackson it was held that a sealed letter intrusted to the
mail is protected by the [Fourth] [Almendment[] ....
There is, in
essence, no difference between the sealed letter and the private
telephone message. As [was] said below: "True, the one is visible, the
other invisible; the one is tangible, the other intangible; the one is
sealed, and the other unsealed; but these are distinctions without a
difference."113
Instead, what is relevant is whether the information was voluntarily
provided to a third party for that party's use, distinguishing between
couriers of information-whatever the format-and recipients of
information. In Smith the Supreme Court held there was no REP in the
numbers dialed on a telephone because "[wihen he used his phone,
petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone
company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary
course of business."'1 4 In other words the telephone company must
know the number dialed in order to complete the requested communication. Because the telephone company has no similar need to know the
contents of that communication, the sender retains a REP in those
contents despite the fact that they are every bit as much voluntarily
conveyed to the phone company."'

110. United States v. Bach, 310 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002). Regarding the court's
reference to statutory protection, see supranote 101. The court in Bach declined to decide
whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail because it was not
determinative. See id. at 1066.
111. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
112. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352; Berger, 388 U.S. at 51.
113. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
114. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
115. The contents of a communication are conveyed to the telephone company, and
telephone companies are statutorily authorized to review those contents in order to protect
their rights and property. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000).
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication
service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic
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Similarly, in Miller the Court explained that
[Blanks are not
these are the business records of the banks ....
neutrals in transactions involving negotiable instruments, but parties
to the instruments with a substantial stake in their continued
availability and acceptance. The records of [Miller's] accounts, like all
of the records [which are required to be kept pursuant to the Bank
Secrecy Act,] pertain to transactions to which the bank was itself a
party

....

All of the

documents obtained, including

financial

statements and deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily
conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary
course of business.1 6

The many systems that may route an e-mail along its path, including
the sender's and recipient's ISPs, are not parties to the substantive
communication and do not have any similar stake in that substance.
Instead, like the United States Post Office, they merely require the
addressing information necessary to forward the message closer to its
destination.
Therefore, as with postal mail and telephone conversations, the sender
of e-mail retains no REP in the addressing components, but should
retain a REP in the contents.'17 However, no court has so held, and

communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal
course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary
incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property
of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication
service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring
except for mechanical or service quality control checks.
See, e.g., United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 5 (1997) (cellular provider relied upon
§ 2511(2)(a)(i) to monitor conversations on cloned cellular phones).
116. Miller, 425 U.S. at 440-42 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
117. For an early consideration of this distinction, see Chris J. Katopis, "Searching"
Cyberspace:The Fourth Amendment and ElectronicMail, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
175, 196-203 (1995). The Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, has recognized that

the addressing components of e-mail are analogous to the number dialed on a telephone
and, therefore, receive no Fourth Amendment protection under the REP test. See United
States v. Hambrick, 2000 WL 1062039, *4 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) ("In this case, as
in Miller, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed
to a third party and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business."); Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 418. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court recently determined there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in
remotely stored files, an encouraging, though somewhat clumsily articulated, holding. See
In re John Doe Proceeding, 680 N.W.2d 792, 805 (Wisc. 2004).

There may also be "external" justifications for providing Fourth Amendment protection
to e-mail, such as its significance in the discourse of society (thus implicating the First
Amendment). Such external arguments will not be pursued in this Article. Likewise,
even if courts acknowledge a reasonable expectation of privacy in sent e-mail, Fourth
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the Supreme Court has never explained when information voluntarily
conveyed to a third party "counts" (i.e., one retains no REP, as in Smith
and Miller) and when it does not (i.e., one retains a REP, as in
Katz)." 8
V.

UBIQUITOUS VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE

Packet-switched Telephone
Although a nuanced interpretation of "voluntary disclosure" will
therefore provide Fourth Amendment protection to electronic mail (we
can term this a "limited third party doctrine"), a consideration of
encrypted e-mail will help introduce the true magnitude of this third
party issue. First, however, it is useful to note a technological fortuity
that could lead courts to the right result-namely that the sender of email retains a REP in the contents of the message-but for the wrong
reason. The result would be welcome, but a failure to recognize the
necessary doctrinal change will leave privacy at the mercy of developing
technology.
Unlike the Internet, traditional telephone networks are circuit
switched. When Bob places a telephone call to Alice, the resources
necessary to communicate their words are reserved for the duration of
the call." 9 While this can be frustrating-Bob might get the recording
"all circuits are busy now" if he tries to call on Christmas morning or
Mother's Day--once the connection is established, Bob and Alice know
they will be able to complete their conversation, no matter how
monotonous and lengthy. Even when Alice temporarily puts down the
receiver to look for a document or to let in the dog, the resources they
occupy are unavailable to others. With a circuit-switched system, a fixed
number of lines running under the Atlantic ocean necessarily means that
only a fixed number of New Yorkers can communicate with their London
one time, even if all those users are silent for
counterparts at any
120

A.

significant periods.

Amendment doctrine may allow law enforcement to obtain such content via a mere
subpoena not requiring notice to the sender. This would offer relatively little protection.
See, e.g., United States v. Barr, 605 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). While this is a
significant issue, it too is beyond the scope of this paper.
118. Although the holding in Katz itself dictates that the restrictive view should be
adopted, it is not clear whether the Supreme Court will do so. See infra Section V.G.
119. KuROSE & Ross, COMPUTER NETWORKING, supra note 83, at 13.
120. The lines are multiplexed, so more than one conversation is conveyed on each
physical link. But for our purposes, this is an unnecessary complication. For a description
of multiplexing see id. at 15-18.
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The Internet's packet-switched architecture means that those sending
Internet communications will not hear "all circuits are busy now," but
it also means there is no guarantee when, if ever, a given packet of
information will reach its intended destination. 2 ' Today one can
subscribe to a Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP") service, in which all
telephone calls are, at least in part, packet switched. 2 2 Moreover,
telecommunications providers have begun to route at least portions of
traditional landline telephone conversations via packet switching
because it avoids wasting resources during silent periods. 2 '
Any content communicated over a packet-switched network experiences store and forward delay as it routes through the network, and the
owner of any intermediate system through which the packet traverses
has control over the storage of that content. Therefore, the content can
be retrieved in later than real-time. If courts were to find no REP in the
contents of e-mail because it is necessarily conveyed to others, they
would either have to find likewise for the contents of modern telephone
conversations, an unlikely result, or create an anomaly whereby digitized
voice content passing through precisely the same systems retains a REP
that e-mail content does not.'24
B.

Encryption
In order to better understand the consequences of a third party
doctrine, let us return to Bob and Alice. Bob again wants to send an email to Alice, but this time he wants to take advantage of encryption's
ability to guarantee confidentiality, making the message unintelligible

121. If the reader wonders how e-mail or other data transfer can then function at all
reliably, it is because it depends upon a protocol known as TCP (Transmission Control
Protocol) that provides reliable data transfer by resending lost packets. See id. at 11-12.
If an application instead requires rapid communication but can absorb some data loss, such
as viewing a live sporting event online, a different protocol termed UDP (User Datagram
Protocol) is used. See id. at 12-13.
122. Id. at 18-20; Voice-Over-Internet Protocol, at http://www.fcc.gov/voip; The Quiet
Iconoclast-Face Value, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2004, at 54 (describing "Skype" Internet
telephony service); James Fellows, In Internet Calling; Skype is Living Up to Hype, NEW
YORK TIMES, Sept. 5, 2004.
123. KuROSE & Ross, COMPUTER NETWORKING, supra note 83, at 20. The provider
must still limit the number of simultaneous callers, however, to approximate the
performance guarantee of a circuit.
124. Architectures in which content is necessarily provided to third parties will become
more and more common. For example, airlines currently forbid the use of mobile phones,
not because they are a safety hazard, but because their use would wreak havoc on the
telephone networks as the plane quickly moved from one base station to the next. The
solution is to have all content channeled through the airline. Clearedfor Take-off? Mobile
Phones on Planes, ECONOMIST, Apr. 3, 2004 (available at 2004 WL 62017484).
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to anyone other than his intended recipient. 125 If Bob and Alice select
a secure implementation of a strong cryptographic algorithm and are
careful to maintain the secrecy of the encryption password or "key," not
even the wealthiest and126most able of adversaries will be able to
comprehend the message.
When Bob writes his e-mail, it is in plaintext-anyone can read it,
presuming they understand the language in which it is written. When
he encrypts the message it becomes ciphertext, which, again presuming
a strong algorithm and implementation, is absolute gibberish. A third
party cannot glean any of the plaintext from the ciphertext without
decrypting the message, which requires knowledge of the encryption
passphrase or key. 127 Bob has wisely used technology to guarantee his
privacy vis-A-vis Alice where the law is unsettled. Neither his ISP nor
Alice's ISP, nor any of the many intermediate systems the message
might traverse on its way to Alice's ISP, nor anyone obtaining the
ciphertext from any of those sources, will be able to read the contents of
the message.
So far so good. But it is also possible, indeed perhaps plausible for
encryption neophytes, that Bob and Alice might use an algorithm or
implementation that is crackable. 121 In that case the government
could obtain the ciphertext from the ISP and then decipher the plaintext
without the encryption key. Thus, it is necessary to ask whether, even
if e-mail did not generally retain a REP, would encrypted e-mail retain
such an expectation?
The answer should be an emphatic yes. According to Supreme Court
precedent, one retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in anything
placed inside a closed container.'29
Moreover, this REP receives
significant protection. Absent an exception, police with probable cause
may not open a closed container; they may only seize the container and

125. Confidentiality is one of the three critical functions that cryptography, or
encryption, can provide. It can also provide integrity (permitting the recipient to detect
tampering) and authenticity (permitting the recipient to verify the source of the message).
See BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 86, 93
(2000).
126. Obviously a great number of assumptions go into any statement that alleges a
scientific conclusion without delving into the science itself. For purposes of this paper,
however, it is not necessary to understand the fascinating mathematics of encryption. For
an excellent description of modern cryptography understandable to a lay person, see id. at
85-119. For a lucid description of the mathematics of encryption, see generally BRUCE
SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY (1996).
127. See SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES, supra note 125, at 86-87.
128. See id. at 102-06.
129. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 812 (1982).
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Further, the law is no
seek a warrant to permit its opening. 13
respecter of containers. When it comes to the Fourth Amendment, a
131
So,
pauper's paper bag is as worthy as a king's triple-locked chest.
if Bob decided to personally walk a printout of his message to Alice,
whether he chose to enclose the message in a brown paper bag, an
attach6 case, or ciphertext, he should retain a REP in its contents.
Does the result change when Bob gives that closed container to
another party for temporary safekeeping, here his ISP? While the law
in this area is not without ambiguity, courts have held that a person
providing a closed container to another for temporary safekeeping can
retain a REP in the contents of that container.'32 And with regard to

130. Id. ("In ruling that the warrantless search of the footlocker was unjustified, the
Court reaffirmed the general principle that closed packages and containers may not be
searched without a warrant."). See also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114
(1984).
Letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the
public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of
such effects are presumptively unreasonable. Even when government agents may
lawfully seize such a package to prevent loss or destruction of suspected
contraband, the Fourth Amendment requires that they obtain a warrant before
examining the contents of such a package.
Id. The exceptions include customs searches (see Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114 n.8; Ross, 456
U.S. at 823), a search not exceeding the scope of a prior search by a non-governmental
actor (see Jacobsen,466 U.S. at 115-16), a search incident to a lawful arrest (see Ross, 456
U.S. at 823), and when the container is located within an automobile (see Ross, 456 U.S.
at 823). See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 5.5 (2004) (describing five additional categories).
131. Ross, 456 U.S. at 822-23 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment provides protection to the
owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view.") The Court explained
that
a constitutional distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers would be
improper. Even though such a distinction perhaps could evolve in a series of cases
in which paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates were placed
on one side of the line or the other, the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment
forecloses such a distinction. For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is
absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic
mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush*and a few articles of
clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his
possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked
attach6 case.
Id. at 822.
132. Thus, in holding unconstitutional the search of a bag deposited with a grocery
store clerk, the District of Columbia Circuit stated
[t]he implications of the government's argument [that he retained no reasonable
expectation of privacy] are most disturbing. In a variety of circumstances, we are
all forced to surrender our possessions temporarily to the custody of others. We
leave our bags with clerks at stores, museums, and restaurants; we check our
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letters and packages sent via either postal mail or private courier, the
13 3
Thus, if
most analogous to e-mail, the Supreme Court has so held.
police were to obtain the container (an encrypted e-mail) from the bailee
(Bob's ISP or other intermediary), they would not have the authority to
peruse its contents.
Yet a knowledgeable commentator, Orin Kerr, has arrived at 1 3a4
contrary conclusion, namely that encryption does not create a REP.
While I believe there are subtle errors in Professor Kerr's legal
analysis,1 5 for our purposes we need only focus on Kerr's clever

luggage when we travel by train or by air; we park our cars at commercial
garages. The suggestion that police in these situations may conduct warrantless
searches of belongings finds no support in precedent or logic.
United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1989). This rule, however, is not
absolute:
[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary
consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but
may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who
possessed ... sufficient relationship to the .... effects sought to be inspected.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). See generally LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, supra note 130, at § 8.6(a). Such a relationship is absent when the bailee is
provided a sealed container and not given permission to open it. See United States v.
James, 353 F.3d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 2003).
133. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
Letters and sealed packages.., in the mail are as fully guarded from examination
and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were
retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional guarantee of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against
inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened
and examined under like warrant ... as is required when papers are subjected to
search in one's own household.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (same for letters and packages
provided to a private carrier).
134. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create
a "ReasonableExpectation of Privacy?," 33 CONN. L. REV. 503 (2001).
135. While the alleged errors in his typically insightful piece are not critical to this
paper, it would be bad form to allege error without at least alluding to its content.
Stripped to its essence, the authority Kerr uses contains supportive dicta but is either
inapposite or unpersuasive. First he cites United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir.
1992), in which the First Circuit allowed government agents to reconstruct shredded paper
found in the defendant's trash. Id. at 929. But because there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in property thus exposed to the public (see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,
40-41 (1988)) or abandoned (see Scott, 975 F.2d at 929), it does not follow that shredding
documents does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy just as effectively as any
other closed container. Were the documents in a triple-locked safe located in that same
trash, the government could seemingly break it open based on its "garbage" status. Next,
Kerr cites United States v. Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999), in which the
Tenth Circuit held that "encoding" conversations in Spanish did not prevent a government
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hypothetical: The infamous Lex Luthor, of Superman fame, prints an
advertisement in the newspaper offering a trade. If $100 million is
wired to his bank account, he will provide the key that will decrypt the
enclosed message describing where and when he plans some "diabolical
entertainment." An enterprising police officer instead scrutinizes the
encrypted message over breakfast-no doubt consisting of donuts-and
realizes Luthor used only a simple substitution cipher, with B substituting for A, C substituting for B, etc. He quickly unscrambles the message
and averts disaster at no cost to the taxpayer other than his salaried

pay.136
Averting disaster is good, but also putting away the would-be
perpetrator is even better. Kerr is unwilling to accept that Luthor would
be able to suppress the evidence found as a result of the officer's
decryption, a result he feels should follow if encryption creates a
REP.137 First, it does not seem clear that this result would follow. If
a convicted kidnapper confronts an officer on the street, holds up a
briefcase, and states, "I've kidnapped another little girl, and her name
and address just happen to be in this briefcase, too bad you can't open
it!," it seems obvious the officer can seize the briefcase based on probable
cause (a confession) and open it immediately on account of exigent
circumstances. A court authorizing such conduct ex-post would not be
denying that the briefcase created a REP in its contents, but rather
would be making the unremarkable declaration that the search was
reasonable under the circumstances and, hence, constitutional. A court
could likewise ratify the officer's conduct in the Luthor hypothetical
without denying the container, namely encryption, its due.
Of course Luthor thoughtfully provided until noon the next day for
officers to obtain and wire the $100 million; perhaps there was no
exigency. But this is akin to our kidnapper holding up the briefcase and

agent listening to a recording of the conversations from translating them to English. The
discussion of Kerr's Luthor hypothetical, infra, describes the relevance of defendants
having adopted a "code" known by hundreds of millions of people. Last, Kerr cites
Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Pa. 1991), in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court allowed police to use evidence obtained via a warrant search of defendant's
computer that was marked for deletion but not yet overwritten. That police may, pursuant
to a warrant, search within any particularly described location that may contain items
subject to seizure is well settled (see Ross, 456 U.S. at 820), but it has no bearing on
whether police may search that same location without a warrant as Kerr argues.
Somewhat different responses to Professor Kerr are made by Sean J. Edgett, Student Note,
Double-Clicking on Fourth Amendment Protection: Encryption Creates a Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 339 (2003).
136. Kerr, supra note 134, at 519.
137. Id. at 519-20.
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instead stating, "I'm going to kidnap another little girl tomorrow, and
her name and address just happen to be in this briefcase." Even if there
were insufficient exigency, and therefore, the officer would be authorized
only to seize the briefcase and seek a warrant permitting it to be
searched, this does not indicate that the briefcase is now a "better"
container, creating "more" of a REP. It merely recognizes that the same
privacy invasion that is reasonable in one circumstance is not reasonable
in another. So too with Luthor's encryption.
But the cipher chosen by Luthor is childish, on par with Pig-Latin. 3 '
Could it really be necessary that an officer obtain a warrant before
utilizing his or her ordinary intelligence to decipher the message? The
Supreme Court has answered sensibly in the negative. While the Court
has refused to create a jurisprudence of "worthy" and "unworthy"
containers, Luthor's simple substitution cipher is akin to our kidnapper
holding up a transparent bag, perhaps a Ziploc. In the words of the
Court, "the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every
container that conceals its contents from plain view."139 A Ziploc bag
provides a wonderful seal, but it doesn't conceal its contents from an
officer possessing ordinary eyesight. Likewise, a substitution cipher does
not conceal a message from an officer possessing ordinary intelligence.
In both instances the content is in "plain view."140
Even with these limitations, Kerr's Luthor hypothetical is insightful
because it presents an interesting question: Is it simply too bizarre to
accept a Fourth Amendment that might restrict police from using
If Luthor had chosen a stronger
information provided to them?'
cryptographic algorithm, the officer would not have been able to decrypt
the message without the aid of technology. Would it be strange to deny
the officer the use of that technology absent a warrant, or is this the
Fourth Amendment we have had all along? Should the ability to "see
through" a closed briefcase via x-rays or other electromagnetic waves

138. While substitution ciphers are common fodder for newspaper puzzle pages and are
easy to solve for some, they are much more complicated than Luthor's because they do not
merely shift every letter by one.
139. Id. at 522-23.
140. See LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 130, at § 5.5(f) (describing
containers that permit an observer to view or infer their contents). The reader should be
careful not to conflate the discussion here with situations in which the content is not
affirmatively provided to the party from which it is obtained by the government. See
Section III, supra,discussing unencrypted e-mail. Professor Kerr had no reason to address
this situation.
141. It is not at all unfamiliar in criminal jurisprudence that we might deny police, or
at least prosecutors, use of information police obtain (think of Miranda),but here police are
being provided the information.
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mean police have carte blanche authority to do so without Fourth
Amendment restraint? In order to answer these questions it is helpful
to review some modern technologies.
C. Millimeter Waves
Although most of us are unaware of it, our bodies are constantly
radiating energy. In fact all objects above a temperature of absolute zero
emit electromagnetic radiation."" Thus, the paper on which these
words are printed emits radiation, as does the chair on which you may
be sitting. We cannot see this radiation unless it is within the visible
spectrum, meaning within those wavelengths of electromagnetic energy
that are detectable by the human eye.' 43
While this may seem an idle scientific curiosity, it becomes extremely
relevant if you want to know what someone is carrying on his or her
person. It just so happens that the human body is more emissive in the
millimeter wave spectrum than most other objects, including guns,
And just as visible light
knives, or particulates such as cocaine.'
transmits through glass, millimeter waves transmit through clothing. 45 Thus, enterprising scientists are developing handheld devices

142. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE TECHNOLOGIES OF CONCEALED WEAPON
AND CONTRABAND IMAGING AND DETECTION, NIJ Guide 602-00, at 16 (2001), available at
www.nlectc.org. This is not the "zero" we typically relate to temperature in the United
States, which would be zero degrees Fahrenheit. Absolute zero is zero Kelvin, which is
equivalent to negative 460 degrees Fahrenheit or negative 273 degrees Celsius. See id.;
EDWIN R. JONES & RICHARD L. CHILDERS, CONTEMPORARY COLLEGE PHYSICS 348 (3d ed.
2001).
143. See JONES & CHILDERS, supra note 142, at 685-87. It is a familiar concept that
electromagnetic radiation exists that is not visible to our eye-we all know that ultraviolet
rays emitted by the sun can burn our skin. Yet unlike radiation in the visible spectrum,
ultraviolet rays are almost completely reflected by glass, and thus, one cannot get a
sunburn (or tan) through an automobile windshield.
Bodies at moderate temperature generally emit mostly in the infrared spectrum, which
is a longer wavelength than visible light, and only as a body is heated does it emit more
and more into the visible spectrum. Thus, a heated object appears red, a hotter object
appears yellow, and an even hotter object appears blue, because the eye "sees" the
wavelengths in the visible spectrum as moving from red to yellow to blue. See id. at 76263, 862-63.
144. See GUIDE TO THE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 142, at 48-49; Eric Siegel, Seethrough Device Detects Hidden Arms, BALTIMORE SUN, May 19, 1995, at IA; Michael
Fleeman, See-through Means to Target Terrorism, HOBART MERCURY (Australia), Aug. 17,
1996; Fox Butterfield, JusticeDept. Awarding Grantsto Develop Gun Detectors,N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 1995, at A22.
145. Nigel Hawkes & Oliver Wright, The Machine That Leaves You No Place to Hide,
THE TIMES (London), Nov. 8, 2003, at 11. Another spectrum of wavelengths we commonly
encounter that transmit through objects are radio waves; if they did not, it would be
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that display
an image of an individual and any items that individual is
4
carrying.

6

Such a device is entirely passive, meaning it emits no radiation as
would a typical x-ray device.'4 7 It is in essence a video camera, only
one that is interested in millimeter waves rather than those in the
visible spectrum. Hence, the device merely receives what is "voluntarily
provided" and displays that information in a convenient format. 4
D. Off-the-window Eavesdropping
When a person speaks, those of us blessed with hearing can hear that
speech because we have a membrane in our ears that is sensitive to
sound waves.'49 Sound waves propagate through the air carrying
energy. 5 ° When a wave encounters a solid object, energy will continue
into the solid and cause the solid to vibrate. The magnitude of such
vibrations is of course small for ordinary sound volumes, and the
vibrations cannot be detected by the human eye.'' If that solid is a

impossible to listen to a radio located entirely inside a home or receive a call on the cellular
telephone in your pocket.
146. See Justice Technology Information Network, Passive Millimeter Wave Camerafor
Concealed Weapons Detection, at http://www.nlectc.org/virlib/InfoDetail.asp?intInfoID=202;
Trex Enterprises, Concealed Weapon Detector, at http://www.trexenterprises.com/safe
secur.html; Butterfield, supra note 144. Non-portable passive millimeter-wave imagers are
already actively deployed. See Hawkes & Wright, supra note 145; QinetiQ, Passenger
Security Scanning, at http://www.qinetiq.com/home/markets/security/transport-security/
aviation-security/security-scanning.html. Such a device can also be used to see through

walls. See Hawkes & Wright, supra note 145; Trex Enterprises, Hostage Detection, at
http://www.trex enterprises.com/safesecur.html. Passive millimeter-wave detectors are also
described by David A. Harris, Superman'sX-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The
New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (1996).
147. See GUIDE TO THE TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 142, at 17, 31, 43-44; Butterfield,
supra note 144.
148. Just as one could avoid providing information to Internet third-parties by
foregoing the use of e-mail, one could avoid providing information to those equipped with
millimeter wave detectors by shielding his or her body from such emissions. Once a person
is made aware of the relevant science, any decision not to counter that science can be
deemed "voluntary."
149. See LAURALEE SHERWOOD, HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY: FROM CELLS TO SYSTEMS 216 (5th
ed. 2004).
150. Sound, including the human voice, is a longitudinal wave, meaning it is a series
of compressions and expansions of air molecules that propagates through the air (visualize
a slinky, stretched at one end and then released). It is termed a longitudinal wave to
distinguish it from a transverse wave, which would result if one end of a rope were pulled
up and then back down. See JONES & CHILDERS, supra note 142, at 406-13.
151. See id. at 412-13; SHERWOOD, supra note 149, at 215. That solids will vibrate from
sound waves is a phenomenon most of us will recognize from our involuntary experiences
with extremely loud car stereos.
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window, however, and if a laser beam is directed at that window, the
beam will be modulated by those vibrations. That modulation will
contain the same information one's ear would obtain inside the room;
hence, a person located outside the room or building can hear the
conversation. 152
Although such a device is not entirely passive (the laser itself
propagates energy, a small portion of which will travel into the window),
it creates only the most negligible of disturbances to an outside window
where it merely receives information "voluntarily provided" and conveys
that information in an audible format.
TEMPEST
TEMPEST is the military's term for van Eck radiation, which is the
radiation unintentionally leaked by all electronic equipment. 15 3 While
this is ordinarily a mere nuisance (perhaps a hairdryer or blender
disrupting television reception), computers are subject to this leakage
like all other electronic devices. A computer's monitor is particularly
drives, cables, printers, and all other peripherals also
leaky, but hard
15 4
radiation.
leak
E.

152. Maggie Farley, Speak Into My Attachg Case:At the U.N., Few Conversations are
Safe From Listening Devices, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at Al (noting the technology and
alleging, according to an unnamed former CIA official, that it is utilized at the U.N. in New
York); Eric Hanson, Deadly finale at Mount Carmel:Agents had Array of ElectronicBugs,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Apr. 22, 1993, at A12 (describing technology and supposing,
according to a private expert in counter-surveillance techniques, that it was used at the
In order to discern the conversation, the
Branch Davidian compound in Waco).
eavesdropper must be able to filter out ambient noise, such as that from birds chirping or
cars driving nearby. George J. Church, The Art of High-Tech Snooping: How Nigh-invisible
Devices Can Get Under an Embassy's Skin, TIME, Apr. 20, 1987, at 22. A countermeasure
is available via devices that vibrate widows with white noise-unless the would-beeavesdropper has access to that white noise as well, he or she will be unable to filter it
from the desired conversation. See id.; Andrew Baxter, Inside Track: Good Vibrations for
Everyday Objects, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 11, 2000, at 17 (noting use of the defense at a
bank).
In concept such a device is not new: "It is said that certain types of electronic rays
beamed at walls or glass windows are capable of catching voice vibrations as they are
bounced off the surfaces." Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47 (1967).
153. SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES, supra note 125, at 220. The term "van Eck" radiation
is in honor of Dutch physicist Wim van Eck, who published a paper in 1985 describing the
phenomenon. Further information on TEMPEST is available at http://www.shmoo.com/
tempest, including a link to van Eck's paper. The Shmoo Group, Tempest, van Eck
phreaking, and High Tech Tinfoil, available at http://www.Shmoo.com/tempest.
154. SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES, supra note 125, at 220. It is possible to shield such
devices, essentially by creating a Faraday cage of conducting materials around the device,
but doing so is costly. Id.; Church, supra note 152. For a provider of such solutions see
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This leaked radiation can be detected, and the information a device is
processing can sometimes be extracted. Thus, Peter Wright claims that
M15 was able to obtain the plaintext of French communications despite
being unable to break its diplomatic cipher,'55 and television "police"
in Britain are able to catch scofflaws of their infamous television
license. 156 And it is possible, given appropriate environmental conditions and suitable equipment, to view the contents of a computer monitor
from down the street.'57 Such equipment, like a millimeter wave video
camera, is entirely passive. The device merely receives what is
"voluntarily provided" and displays that information in a convenient
format.
F

Distributive Effect
Millimeter wave detectors, off-the-window eavesdropping, and
TEMPEST receivers are all sophisticated, but they are within the reach
of current technology. Thus, police equipped with modern technology are
"voluntarily provided" with substantial information previously protected
by the Fourth Amendment, first under the property-based conception
and then, when new technologies made that inadequate, under the
reasonable expectation of privacy conception. If courts do not adopt the
limited third party doctrine, the use of such devices may dramatically
increase.
At least two factors influence the prevalence of a policing technique.
First, there are costs independent of legal regulation. For example,
neither the use of undercover agents nor stakeouts are restricted by the
Fourth Amendment, 5 ' but both activities are very expensive in terms
of police time. Further, undercover agents are often at significant risk

www.compsecinc.com.
155.

PETER

WRIGHT,

SPYCATCHER:
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CANDID AUTOBIOGRAPHY

OF A
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INTELLIGENCE OFFICER (1986). Encrypting data does not itself defend against TEMPEST
because it is a "side-channel attack"-the plaintext can leak right along with the encrypted
text. See SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES, supra note 125, at 220.
156. Jeff Daeschner, Telly "Police"use Hi-tech Weapons in War on Tax Dodgers,HOBART
MERCURY (Australia), Dec. 26, 1998.
157. SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES, supra note 125, at 220. The leaked radiation not only
travels through the air; it can also travel over power or telephone lines, or can be
retransmitted via cell phone or radio. Id. An extensive amount of information on
TEMPEST is available at Joel McNamara, The Complete, Unofficial TEMPEST Information
Page, at http://www.eskimo.com/-joelm/tempest.html.
158. As to undercover agents, see the discussion of the false friend cases (Hoffa and
White), supra notes 59-68. As to stakeouts, see the discussion of tracking automobiles
(Knotts and Karo), infra.
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of harm. Therefore, we can presume police will be judicious in their use
of these techniques.'5 9
As William Stuntz has forcefully argued, a second factor is legal
regulation.1 6 ° "[Liegal regulation acts as a tax, a mechanism for
16
making some activities more expensive relative to their substitutes." '
Because we have a multi-tiered Fourth Amendment in which some
activities are strictly regulated (e.g., the search of a home) and others
receive no restriction (e.g., those deemed not a search), resourcepolice are likely to engage in less of the former and more of
constrained
162
latter.
the
If courts were to reject the limited third party doctrine and opt for a
broad conception of voluntary disclosure, these two factors would
6
combine to dramatically skew police resources. ' Unlike the use of
undercover agents or stakeouts, the cost of using devices like those
described above is negligible. While the cost of the equipment may
currently be high, it will decrease dramatically over time and is a onetime sunk cost. Technologically-enhanced searches thus have a natural
efficiency, tending to lower the cost of obtaining a given quantum of
information. While ideally the Fourth Amendment would right this
balance, under a broad conception of voluntary disclosure, the opposite
will occur.
Rather than obtaining the probable cause necessary to search a
person, police could use a passive millimeter wave detector.164 Rather
than obtaining a warrant authorizing a bug, police could use off-the-

159. See William J. Stuntz, The Distributionof Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1277 (1988-1999).
160. Id. at 1274.
161. Id.
162. See id. at 1275-76. Professor Stuntz examines this distribution effect in detail as
it relates to drug crime and demonstrates that "policing urban crack markets is cheaper
than policing suburban markets in cocaine powder, and Fourth Amendment law makes
that cost gap substantially larger than it otherwise might be." Id. at 1285. This leads him
to argue that we should rethink our conception of the privacy interest protected by the
Fourth Amendment. See id. at 1289.
163. Legislatures could of course regulate or prohibit such activity. It is the
responsibility of courts to interpret the Fourth Amendment, however, and there are reasons
of permanence to prefer rights be protected by the Constitution rather than merely by
legislation. For a view that favors Congressional action in this arena over judicial
interpretation, however, see Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace, supra note 134.
164. Police can conduct a protective "pat down" merely upon the dual reasonable
suspicion that a crime has been committed and that the suspect is armed, but a full search
requires probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
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window eavesdropping.' 65 Rather than obtaining a warrant to install
a keystroke recorder on a computer, police could obtain its real-time
operations via a TEMPEST receiver. 16 In all three instances, the
technologically-enhanced search, absent Fourth Amendment restriction,
is likely to be far cheaper than the Fourth Amendment restricted
alternative.
G. Kyllo
The Supreme Court has yet to adopt the limited third party doctrine
and has at times seemed entirely indifferent to the intrusive capability
of modern technology. When law enforcement was able to track a
vehicle only via an electronic tracking device, the Court brushed aside
the contention that the technology could be relevant and stated that
"[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such
67
enhancement as science and technology afforded them.""
68
Yet the Court's opinion in Kyllo v. United States, while far from
a model of judicial clarity, demonstrates that at least some of the

165. While the Fourth Amendment would term the required judicial authorization a
"warrant" no matter what specific requirements were necessary to render the search
reasonable, the Wiretap Act requires what is often termed a "Title III order" after Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
166. If the computer was located in the home, the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo
would impose a Fourth Amendment restraint because Kyllo implicitly adopts the limited
third party doctrine in the home context. See infra Part V(G).
167. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). Knotts is discussed in more
detail infra Part VI(B). The Court's precise language ends with "such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them in this case," which could serve as a limiting
principle, but the Court made no effort to articulate what that limitation might be. See id.
Three Justices, in concurrence, similarly truncated the majority's language. Id. at 288
(Stevens, J., concurring). The Court went on to conclude that "[i]nsofar as respondent's
complaint appears to be simply that scientific devices such as the [electronic] beeper
enabled the police to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional
foundation. We have never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality, and we
decline to do so now." Id. at 284.
A majority of the Court was similarly unphased by the use of technology in a series of
cases in which the Court held that airplane and helicopter flyovers did not constitute
searches. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (concerning naked-eye
observation from helicopter circling at 400 feet); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)
(concerning naked-eye observation from airplane flying at 1,000 feet); Dow Chemical Co.
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229, 239 (1986) (concerning aerial photography from
airplane at 1,200 feet using $22,000 camera). All three cases split the Court five to four,
however.
168. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

20051

NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN

541

Justices have begun to advert to the danger of increasingly intrusive
technology. The indoor growth of marijuana typically requires highintensity lamps, which emit infrared radiation. This radiation can be
detected and displayed by a video camera attuned to those wavelengths
of electromagnetic energy.16 9 When a federal agent suspected that
Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home, the agent, from the
vantage point of his patrol car positioned on the public street, used such
an imager to measure and display the relative amounts of radiation
emanating from the home.17 ° In the words of the district court, the
imager was "a non-intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and
shows a crude visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside
Court was whether this constiof the house." 7' The question for the
17 2
tuted a Fourth Amendment search.
The radiation emanating from Kyllo's home, whether from highintensity lamps or leakage from his computer, was available to anyone
equipped to receive it, and Kyllo could have blocked it. He did not,
however, affirmatively provide the information to others intending that
it be used. Thus, the limited third party doctrine would not foreclose the
possibility that the agent's use of the thermal imager constituted a
Fourth Amendment search, 7 ' while a broad interpretation of the
doctrine would require a holding of no search.
Unfortunately, the Court's opinion, penned by Justice Scalia for a fivemember majority,'74 failed to address the third party doctrine. Instead, it focused on the constitutional space involved in this intrusion,
the home, and the special place it holds in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 75 However, the Court's holding that the thermal scan did

169. Such a device operates just like the millimeter wave camera described in Section
V(C).
170. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29-30.
171. Id. at 30.
172. When the scan detected high levels of infrared radiation consistent with an indoor
growing operation, agents used this information, informants' tips, and utility bills to obtain
a search warrant. Inside they found more than 100 marijuana plants. Id.
173. Under current doctrine it would still be necessary to consider whether Kyllo had
a reasonable expectation of privacy. For a discussion of the wisdom of this requirement
see infra Section VI.A.
174. Joining Justice Scalia were Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, not
a typical five-member voting block of the Court.
175. After quoting the text of the Fourth Amendment, the Court began its analysis by
asserting that "'[alt the very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."'
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
Rather than discussing technologically-enhanced searches in general, the Court limited its
analysis to those impacting the home:
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constitute a search is consistent with the limited third party doctrine. 7 ' And the opinion contains encouraging words regarding the
relevance of technology:
The question we confront today is what limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy ....
While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the
rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that
are already in use or in development.' 77
However, the majority's failure to address the third party doctrine
renders the entire opinion of questionable significance outside the
context of the home.
The four-member dissent, penned by Justice Stevens, squarely frames
the issue the majority neglected: "'What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.' That is the principle implicated here."'78
That is precisely the principle implicated, and the dissent would have
done well had it examined that issue carefully. Instead, the dissent
erroneously concluded that there was no search because the surveillance
was "off-the-wall" rather than "through-the-wall."'79
This distinction, which implicitly adopts a broad interpretation of the
third party doctrine, seems to conflict with Katz itself. After all, the bug
in Katz was placed on the outside of the public telephone booth, the
seeming equivalent of the off-the-window eavesdropping described in

[W]e have applied the [Katz] test on two different occasions in holding that aerial
surveillance of private homes and surrounding areas does not constitute a search.
The present case involves officers on a public street engaged in more than nakedeye surveillance of a home. We have previously reserved judgment as to how
much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from such a vantage
point, if any, is too much. While we upheld enhanced aerial photography of an
industrial complex in Dow Chemical, we noted that we found "it important that
this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private home, where privacy
expectations are most heightened."
Id. at 33 (internal citations omitted); See id. at 37-38 (further discussing the unique context
of the home). The Court concluded that "the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the
entrance to the house. That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright." Id. at
40 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
176. Id. at 40 ("Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search.'").
177. Id. at 34, 36. The court cited several systems designed to "see" through walls. Id.
at 36 n.3.
178. Id. at 42 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351) (Stevens, Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
179. Id. at 41 (Stevens, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
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Section IV(D). But the dissent believed it could distinguish the holdings
because
[uin Katz, the electronic listening device attached to the outside of the
phone booth allowed the officers to pick up the content of the conversa-

tion inside the booth, making them the functional equivalent of
intruders because they gathered information that was otherwise
available only to someone inside the private area; it would be as if, in
this case, the thermal imager presented a view of the heat-generating
activity inside petitioner's home. By contrast, the thermal imager here
disclosed only the relative amounts of heat radiating from the house;
it would be as if, in Katz, the listening device disclosed only the
relative volume of sound leaving the booth, which presumably was
The use of the latter device [i.e.,
discernible in the public domain ....
one disclosing only volume] would be constitutional given Smith v.
Maryland, which upheld the use of pen registers to record numbers
dialed on a phone because, unlike "the listening device employed in
Katz ... pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications."'80
This attempt to distinguish Katz demonstrates a complete failure to
appreciate the third party doctrine, apparently believing those cases
distinction between "content" and "nonrelied on some talismanic
81
content" information.'
Thus, Kyllo is a mixed bag. Five members of the Court seem to
appreciate technology's relevance to what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, which is encouraging even though it is questionable what
they would hold outside the context of the home. But while their
holding is consistent with the limited third party doctrine, they failed to

180. Id. at 49-50, 50 n.6 (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (Stevens,
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
181. Precisely what information would constitute "content" outside the context of
human speech is left unclear, but apparently the following would not:
[P]ublic officials should not have to avert their senses or their equipment from
detecting emissions in the public domain such as excessive heat, traces of smoke,
suspicious odors, odorless gasses, airborne particulates, or radioactive emissions,
any of which could identify hazards to the community. In my judgment,
monitoring such emissions with "sense-enhancing technology," and drawing useful
conclusions from such monitoring, is an entirely reasonable public service.
Id. at 45 (internal citation omitted) (Stevens, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, JJ.,
dissenting). Of course whether such conduct is "reasonable" is an entirely separate
question from whether it constitutes a search, but Justice Stevens seems to use the two
interchangeably.
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recognize that issue. Even more discouraging
is that four members of
182
the Court would vote to the contrary.
VI.

WHAT IS REASONABLE?

Sections III and IV demonstrate that the REP test and a limited third
party doctrine provide Fourth Amendment protection for many
technologically-enhanced searches. This is important because courts
tend to favor clarifications and minor adjustments, and this is one that
realistically can and should be made. But this is not to say that either
doctrine is sensible. Before turning to how courts should interpret
reasonableness in the context of technologically-enhanced intrusions, it
is helpful to briefly reconsider why we have the REP test.
A.

REP Redux
For those concerned about privacy vis-A-vis the government, once
technology allowed intrusion without physical encroachment Katz's test
was a great improvement over Olmstead's property-based conception.
But the language of the Fourth Amendment states that "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
1 3
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."
While neither the term "search" nor "seizure" is defined by the Constitution, they are (and were, at the time of the founding) ordinary, commonplace words.8
Should they not bear that ordinary meaning? The
Supreme Court's definition of "seizure" seems to follow this logical mold:
a seizure occurs when there is "some meaningful interference with an
individual's possessory interests in ...

property."

s5

So while Katz's

182. Moreover, the federal circuits that had considered the issue had uniformly sided
with the Kyllo dissenters. See id. at 46 n.4.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
184.
When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, to "search" meant "[t]o look
over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by
inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief." N.
Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 66 (1828) (reprint 6th
ed. 1989).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 n.1. One contemporary dictionary gives its first definition of "search"
as: "To make a thorough examination of; look over carefully in order to find something;
explore." AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1997).
185. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). A contemporary dictionary
defines seizure as "[tihe act or an instance of seizing or the condition of being seized," and
its first definition of seize is "[tlo grasp suddenly and forcibly; take or grab." Other
definitions include "[to take into custody; capture" and "[t]o take quick and forcible
possession of; confiscation." AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1997).
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conception was an improvement upon Olmstead, we are left to wonder
why either Court thought it necessary to artificially limit the meaning
of "search."
The Court in Olmstead implied that its limitation on "search" was
necessary to avoid a dramatic result. According to the Court, a
beneficent desire to give the Fourth Amendment a liberal construction
to "effect the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in the interest
of liberty ... cannot justify enlargement of the language employed
beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and
effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing
or sight."186 Even if both hearing and sight constitute a "search," it
does not follow that they are necessarily unreasonable and, hence,
forbidden.
But Olmstead was decided in an era in which the Court tenaciously
hung to the mantra that warrantless searches were presumptively
unconstitutional. Indeed in Katz, when adopting the REP definition, the
Court emphatically stated:
Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes, and that
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
to a few specifically established and wellAmendment-subject only
187
delineated exceptions.
Therefore, if a warrantless intrusion were to be deemed constitutional,
it must either fall within one of those "few ... exceptions" or not be a
search at all.
The Court's recent jurisprudence instead recognizes that finding the
Fourth Amendment to be implicated does not forbid anything; its
command is only that any search or seizure be reasonable.' 8 Thus, in
describing the transition from Olmstead's property-based conception as
it relates to visual observation of a home, the Court in Kyllo stated:
One might think that the new validating rationale would be that
examining the portion of a house that is in plain public view, while it
is a "search," despite the absence of trespass, is not an "unreasonable"
one under the Fourth Amendment. But in fact we have held that
visual observation is no 'search' at all-perhaps in order to preserve

186. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465 (emphasis added).
187. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
188. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002) ("We must therefore
review the School District's Policy for 'reasonableness,' which is the touchstone of the
constitutionality of a governmental search.").
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somewhat more intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are
presumptively unconstitutional.'8

9

Thus, the Court, while not yet ready to jettison the REP "two step,"
recognizes its redundancy. By smuggling the term "reasonable" into
REP, the Court's current jurisprudence merely splits into two artificial
steps what could be handled as one. If there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, it would seem to necessarily follow that the intrusion
was a reasonable one. 9 ' Thus, I add my voice to those of Professors
Akhil Amar and Vikram Amar, who eloquently and convincingly made
the case for jettisoning the REP test in favor of a dictionary definition
of search. 9 ' What is important for purposes of this paper, however,
is merely to recognize that with or without a REP requirement, some
form of third party doctrine could be a part of reasonableness, and, with
or without a REP requirement, the real work is done by that reasonableness determination.
B.

The Third Party Doctrine Redux
The third party doctrine is objectionable even if limited as recommended. First, it treats privacy as an indivisible commodity-once information is given to any one party for any one purpose, it is treated as if it
were given to every person for any possible purpose as far as the Fourth
Amendment is concerned. This powerful critique was first made by
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Smith.'92 Second, perhaps a subset of

189. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.
190. Before writing for the Court in Kyllo, Justice Scalia had raised this issue directly
in a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas: "[C]ase law ... leaps to apply the fuzzy
standard of 'legitimate expectation of privacy'-a consideration that is often relevant to
whether a search or seizure covered by the Fourth Amendment is 'unreasonable'-to the
threshold question whether a search or seizure covered by the Fourth Amendment has
occurred." Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1998).
191. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757,
768-70, 783 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, "I Always Feel Like
Somebody's Watching Me": A FourthAmendment Analysis Of The FBI's New Surveillance
Policy, FINDLAW, June 14, 2002, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20020614.
html.
192. 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, Brennan, JJ., dissenting). See also Lewis R. Katz, In
Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564-66
(1990). This critique is certainly applicable to modern technologies. For example, many
drivers in the Northeast take advantage of the E-ZPass, an electronic tag placed inside a
vehicle that makes it unnecessary to stop at toll booths. See E-ZPass Information, How
It Works, at http://www.ezpass.com/static/info/howit.shtml. That those drivers willingly
convey their identity and location to toll collectors does not mean they should be held to
provide it to anyone setting up an antenna to capture that information, including police.
Similarly those using cell-phones convey their location to their cellular providers. See
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the more serious first critique, application of the doctrine is sometimes
ambiguous.
193
Consider the tracking of automobiles. In United States v.Knotts,
officers suspected the defendants were manufacturing illicit drugs.
When one of the defendants purchased a drum of chloroform, officers
followed his vehicle, but they twice lost visual surveillance.1 4 They
were nonetheless able to continue tracking the vehicle because they had
placed an electronic transmitter, or "beeper," in the drum.' 95 But this
too proved difficult and officers lost its signal. Only when a helicopter
was able to relocate the then-stationary transmitter were police led to
the drum's ultimate destination, a secluded cabin. The defendants
alleged that this tracking violated the Fourth Amendment.19
Relying on the third party doctrine, the Supreme Court held that
[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another. When [the defendant] travelled over the public streets he
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was
travelling over particular roads in a particular direction, the fact of
destination when he
whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final
197
exited from public roads onto private property.
Thus, "there was neither a 'search' nor a 'seizure' within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment."1 98
Under a broad conception of the third party doctrine, this holding
seems correct. However, under a limited conception, the proper result
is not immediately apparent. On the one hand, a driver intentionally

Jeffrey Selingo, Protectingthe Cellphone User's Right to Hide, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 2004, at
G7. Some states have rejected the Supreme Court's third party doctrine as a matter of
state law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beauford, 475 A.2d 783, 790 (Pa. Super. 1984)
(deeming Smith v. Maryland "manifestly unpersuasive").
193. 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).
194. Id. at 278. One termination of visual surveillance was a tactical decision based
on defendant's initiation of evasive maneuvers. Id.; United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515,
516 (8th Cir. 1981).
195. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278. "A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery
operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver." Id. at
277. The chemical vendor had consented to its installation. Id. at 278.
196. Id. at 278. When officers searched the cabin pursuant to a search warrant, they
found a fully operable drug laboratory consisting of over $10,000 in equipment and
chemicals in sufficient quantities to produce fourteen pounds of pure amphetamine. Id. at
279.
197. Id. at 281-82.
198. Id. at 285. The following year the Court held that monitoring such a beeper
located within a residence does constitute a search. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705, 714 (1984).
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conveys his or her position to pedestrians and other drivers to avoid an
accident. On the other hand, most drivers would not think they were
conveying their entire driving route to bystanders, though they surely
recognize the possibility that another vehicle will travel the same route
and thereby gather that information. That probability, however,
decreases as the route becomes more lengthy or complex. And unless the
driver consents to electronic surveillance,' 99 the presumption that he
or she intends to convey a driving route that is not amenable to visual
surveillance, as in Knotts, is especially dubious. 0 °
A similar ambiguity arises in the context of "data mining." While, as
noted above, the third party doctrine has always been subject to critique
for adopting an indivisible conception of privacy, it becomes especially
suspect when one considers the extraordinary databases under
construction today. Whether one should be considered to have affirmatively given information to a third party for use when that information
is incorporated into a database of entirely unforeseeable scope and intent
is not clear.
As a final example, consider the Supreme Court's strange jurisprudence of flyovers and baggage squeezes. Relying on the third party
doctrine, the Court has held that all three of the following do not
constitute a search: (1) observation of a fenced residential backyard
within a home's curtilage from the vantage point of a chartered airplane
flying at 1000 feet;201 (2) aerial photography of an industrial manufacturing complex via a $22,000 mapping camera at 1200 feet; 20 2 and (3)
199. One might consent to such surveillance for reasons of personal security or
convenience. See, e.g., http://www.onstar.com (describing OnStar service available in some
vehicles that offers, inter alia,roadside assistance and vehicle tracking). The Ninth Circuit
has held, however, that the government violates the Wiretap Act if it renders such a
system inoperable in order to eavesdrop. See In re Application of the United States, 349
F.3d 1132, 1146 (2003).
200. Some states have rejected Knotts as a matter of state law. See, e.g., State v.
Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (1988) (holding electronic tracking of automobile is a
"search" requiring warrant or exigent circumstances).
201. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986).
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.". . . Any member of the public
flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these
On this record, we readily conclude that respondent's
officers observed.
expectation that his garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable
and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor.
202. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
[The] industrial complex . . . is open to the view and observation of persons in
aircraft lawfully in the public airspace immediately above or sufficiently near the
area for the reach of cameras. We hold that the taking of aerial photographs of
an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by
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observation of a greenhouse in a residential backyard from a helicopter
hovering at 400 feet.20 3 Yet when the Court was called upon to
determine whether a border patrol agent's physical squeeze of a bus
passenger's carry-on bag constituted a search, the Court held in the
affirmative. °4
The flyover holdings are correct under a broad conception of the third
party doctrine, but they seem contrary to the limited doctrine. In all
three cases, the target of the surveillance took significant precautions to
prevent observation.0 5 What is most relevant here, however, is a
comparison of the holdings. Given the Court's decision that there is no
REP in a fenced backyard because that information is knowingly
conveyed to anyone flying overhead, how could there be a REP in
information obtained by squeezing a soft canvas bag placed in a shared
carry-on compartment? In a "world of travel that is somewhat less
gentle than it used to be," °6 surely passengers realize their bags will
be handled by others. Nonetheless, according to the Court, "[pihysically
invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual
inspection."0 7 When the item physically inspected is a soft-cover
carry-on, and the item visually inspected is located within a securely
fenced backyard, this proposition is questionable. But an all or nothing
third party doctrine is prone to creating these types of arbitrary
distinctions.
As with the REP, courts would do better to consider such "degrees" of
providing information to others as a factor in the reasonableness inquiry
rather than as an independent determinative test.

the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 239.
203. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,449 (1989) ("[Olur decision in California v. Ciraolo
controls this case.") (internal citation omitted) (White, J.). Justice White wrote an opinion
for a four-member plurality; Justice O'Connor concurred.
204. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000). The agent felt a "brick-like" object,
after which he requested and obtained consent to search the bag. Id. at 336.
205. In Ciraolothe homeowner surrounded his yard with a 6-foot outer fence and a 10foot inner fence. 476 U.S. at 209. Dow Chemical Company spent millions of dollars each
year on elaborate security precautions. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 241-42 (Powell, J.,
dissenting in part). The homeowner in Riley surrounded his greenhouse with trees and
shrubs and placed a wire fence surrounding the greenhouse and his home. 488 U.S. at 448.
The dissent in Riley implicitly advocated limiting the third party doctrine: "I agree, of
course, that '[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.' But I cannot agree that one 'knowingly exposes [an area] to the
public' solely because a helicopter may legally fly above it." Id. at 457 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
206. Bond, 529 U.S. at 340 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 337.
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C. Reasonableness
As a unanimous Supreme Court stated in 2001,
[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the
reasonableness of a search is determined "by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and,
on the other, the degree to which20 it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate government interests." 8
That comparison, however, need not be conducted in every case. In the
context of the home, for example, the Court has consistently held that
warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional." 9 A government wishing to justify such an intrusion must proffer an adequate
rationale, such as exigent circumstances, consent, or the homeowner's
status as a probationer.210 Only upon such a showing need a court
balance the competing interests.211 In other contexts, however, the
balance must routinely be conducted.
While the Supreme Court has appropriately recognized a wide range
of factors relevant to this calculus, the Court is inconsistent in their
application. Moreover, advancing technology may require that we
rethink what factors are relevant and which way various factors cut.

208. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001). The Court went on to
explain that "[alIthough the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of
probability embodied in the term 'probable cause,' a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution
when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard
reasonable." Id. at 121. See also Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 71 (1992) ("Reasonableness is .. .the ultimate standard under the Fourth Amendment .... As is true in
other circumstances, the reasonableness determination will reflect a careful balancing of
governmental and private interests.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted);
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) ("The Fourth Amendment['s] . .. 'central
requirement' is one of reasonableness."); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 523 U.S. 318, 361
(2001) (terming the balance of interests is the "bedrock" principle of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
209. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 636 (2002) (per curiam) ("absent exigent
circumstances, the firm line at the entrance to the house... may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
210. See id. (exigent circumstances); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (consent);
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987) (probationer).
211. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331.
(In the circumstances of the case before us, we cannot say that the warrantless
seizure was per se unreasonable. It involves a plausible claim of . . . "exigent
circumstances." ... Consequently, rather than employing a per se rule of
unreasonableness, we balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related
concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable.).
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This analysis becomes even more important if the Court were to adopt
a dictionary definition of "search" because intrusions that formerly had
no Fourth Amendment restriction would now be subject to the same
reasonableness criterion.
1. Government Need. Reasonableness requires a court to compare
the intrusion upon privacy with the government need. One element of
government need could be termed "fungibility." If the same information
is available via other less intrusive means, the greater intrusion is likely
to be unreasonable. Thus, the fact that a low-cost, technologicallyenhanced search can obtain needed information should not itself be
sufficient to render that search constitutional.
Another logical element of government need is the magnitude of the
crime at issue. Imagine two police officers, Officer Paul and Officer
Parks. Officer Paul has probable cause to believe a given intrusion will
locate evidence relevant to a murder investigation. Officer Parks has
probable cause to believe the same intrusion will locate evidence that the
suspect is indeed a user of marijuana. Surely the intrusion by Officer
Parks is less likely to be reasonable, and the Supreme Court has
recognized this. The recognition has only been on the periphery,
however, when the crime is especially minor or especially dangerous.
In Welsh v. Wisconsin,2 12 police received a report that an erratically
driven car had swerved off the road into an open field. 13 When
inspection of the now abandoned car revealed that it was registered to
Edward Welsh and that he lived within walking distance, officers
traveled to his residence. Without obtaining a warrant or consent, police
entered the home and proceeded upstairs to Welsh's bedroom where they
found him lying in bed. Welsh was arrested for driving while under the
influence of an intoxicant. Under the laws of Wisconsin at the time, the
offense was a nonjailable violation with a maximum fine of $200.214

212. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
213. Id. at 742. The sole witness pulled off the road behind the erratically-driven
vehicle, and thus, was available for police questioning when they arrived upon the scene.

Id.
214. Id. at 742-43, 743 n.1, 746. Although Welsh's stepdaughter opened the door to
their home, the trial court made no finding regarding consent. Therefore, the Court
presumed an absence of consent for purposes of its opinion.
Welsh was actually subject to a criminal misdemeanor charge with a maximum penalty
of up to one year in jail and a fine of $500 because he had previously been convicted of the
same offense within the previous five years. Id. at 746. The officers entering his home
were unaware of his record, however, and therefore, the Court proceeded as if only the
nonjailable civil violation were at issue. Id. at 746 n.6.
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Welsh challenged the entry into his home, and the Court phrased the
question presented as follows: "[W]hether, and if so under what
circumstances, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making
a warrantless night entry of a person's home in order to arrest him for
a nonjailable traffic offense."215 In other words, when the magnitude
of intrusion is large (entrance into a home) and the magnitude of the
underlying crime is small (deemed by the legislature to be a nonjailable
civil forfeiture offense), can that intrusion be reasonable?
The Court began with its holding in Payton v. New York 216: "[We]
decided in Payton . ..that warrantless felony arrests in the home are
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent
circumstances."2"7 Whether the officers had probable cause was not
before the Court. 2 " The Court accepted the State's asserted exigency,
namely the necessity of determining Welsh's blood-alcohol level before
it naturally decreased with the passage of time.219 Thus, the question
before the Court was the scope of Payton-is the government need for a
non-felony arrest sufficient to render reasonable a warrantless entry into
a home based upon probable cause and the exigency of loss of evidence?
In an unfortunate twist, however, the Court held that the magnitude
of the crime rendered the exigency insufficient, 220 and thus the Court
had "no occasion to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may
impose an absolute ban on warrantless home arrests for certain minor
offenses."221 According to the Court, when the underlying offense is
minor, even the destruction of evidence does not present an exigency
sufficient to justify a warrantless intrusion into the home. 2 Although

215. Id. at 742.
216. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
217. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749.
218. Id. at 748 n.9.
219. Id. at 753-54. The Court had previously recognized the exigency of loss of evidence
via the temporal decrease in blood-alcohol content. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 770-71 (1966) (allowing warrantless blood test for alcohol).
220. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754.
221. Id. at 749 n.1l.
222. Id. at 750-54. The Court adopted the explanation of Justice Jackson in a 1948
concurrence:
Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances might justify a forced
entry without a warrant, no such emergency was present in this case. This
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of all sense of proportion.
Whether there is reasonable necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a
warrant certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the offense thought to
be in progress as well as the hazards of the method of attempting to reach it ....
It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters in a
tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious
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the Court's decision to frame the inquiry as one of insufficient exigency
is unnecessarily confusing, the upshot is unchanged-one factor in
determining the reasonableness of an intrusion is the magnitude of the
underlying crime. Thus, the Court opined that it was "difficult to
conceive of a warrantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable
Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely
under the
22 3
minor.q

The Court has similarly recognized that suspicion of a particularly
serious crime may render reasonable an intrusion that would otherwise
be unreasonable. In Florida v. J.L.,224 a unanimous Court determined
the frisk of a youth based upon an anonymous tip that the youth was
carrying a gun was unconstitutional. 225 But the Court warned against
interpreting its holding as a per se bar.
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be
so great as to justify a search even without a showing of [informant]
reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a person
carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a
a firearm before the police can constitutionreport of a person carrying
22 16
ally conduct a frisk.
Courts should more regularly consider the magnitude of the underlying crime as part of the reasonableness inquiry. 227 Technology will

police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats
of it.
Id. at 751 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459-60 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
223. Id. at 753. The Court distinguished Welsh on its facts in McArthur, 531 U.S. at
335-36, in which the offense was jailable, and the intrusion was of lesser magnitude.
Justice Stevens dissented, disagreeing with the majority's balancing ofinterests: "Following
[the lower courts'] analysis and the reasoning in our decision in Welsh (holding that some
offenses may be so minor as to make it unreasonable for police to undertake searches that
would be constitutionally permissible if graver offenses were suspected), I would affirm."
Id. at 340 (internal citation omitted). Lower courts continue to rely on Welsh. See, e.g.,
Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting
warrantless blood draw).
224. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
225. Id. at 268.
226. Id. at 273-74. Likewise in Indianapolisv. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000), the
Court struck down the use of highway checkpoints to interdict drugs but stated that
similar roadblocks would almost certainly be lawful if their purpose was to thwart a
terrorist attack or catch a dangerous criminal.
227. Outside the context of crime control, the Court consistently considers the
magnitude of the government concern. See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 661 (1995) (articulating that reasonableness requires "an interest that appears
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permit searches that may seem less intrusive but that obtain the same
quantum of information-perhaps a scan by a passive millimeter wave
camera rather than a full-body pat-down, or a single search of an
extensive database rather than a significant background investigation.
Including the magnitude of the alleged crime in the analysis may
prevent courts from too freely authorizing intrusive conduct.228
2. Political Process Checks. A fascinating tale of technological
sleuthing helps demonstrate the role political process checks could play
in the reasonableness inquiry. On March 21, 2003, Michael Little was
driving his truck under an overpass in Surrey, England, when a brick
hurled from above crashed through his windshield and into his chest.
Although he managed to maneuver his 44-ton truck to the shoulder, he
died of a heart attack before a police patrol located him three hours
later. Such a random and senseless crime is difficult to solve, but police
received a break when they discovered the perpetrator's blood on the
brick, from which they were able to extract his DNA. When they ran a
fingerprint of that DNA through Britain's database of criminal offenders,
however, there were no matches.22 9
The perpetrator, a teenager named Craig Harman, had enjoyed a
night of drinking with friends. When he came upon a Renault Clio
parked in a driveway, he broke the windshield as part of a fruitless

important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors that
show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy"). In
Vernonia the government need was deterring drug use by schoolchildren. See id. at 661.
228. The Seventh Circuit has recognized the criterion in dicta:
The usual way in which judges interpreting the Fourth Amendment take account
of the fact that searches vary in the degree to which they invade personal privacy
is by requiring a higher degree of probable cause (to believe that the search will
yield incriminating evidence), and by being more insistent that a warrant be
obtained if at all feasible, the more intrusive the search is. But maybe in dealing
with so intrusive a technique as television surveillance, other methods of control
as well, such as banning the technique outright from use in the home in
connection with minor crimes, will be required, in order to strike a proper balance
between public safety and personal privacy.
United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted).
William Stuntz has proffered that "where the search tactic is both secret and potentially
invasive, it should probably be limited to the investigation of violent felonies." William J.
Stuntz, Local PolicingAfter Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2184 (2002). Professor Stuntz has
convincingly critiqued what he terms the "transsubstantive" Fourth Amendment. See
William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 874 (2001).
229. Matthew Falloon, DNA TrapsBrick Thrower Who Killed Lorry Driver, GuARDIAN,
Apr. 20, 2004, at 6; Steve Bird, M3 Brick Killer Tracked Through a Relative's DNA, TIMES
(London), Apr. 20, 2004, at 11.
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effort to steal the vehicle. In so doing, he cut his hand. When he and
a friend later picked up bricks, Harman's blood transferred to the brick
30
that would shortly thereafter crash into Little's windshield.
1
police turned to Britain's Forensic Science
Having no other leads,
Service. Running Harman's DNA fingerprint through their system
resulted in a list of persons who shared eleven or more genetic markers
with the perpetrator. Narrowing that list by geography left a man who
shared sixteen markers with the perpetrator. That person was Craig
Harman's brother.232 Craig pleaded guilty to manslaughter when a
sample of his DNA was a perfect match for that found on the brick.233
Thus, technologically-enhanced sleuthing found a killer, albeit an
4
Britain
unintentional one, who will now spend six years in prison.
leads the world in this use of "familial DNA" because it has the first and
most expansive DNA database in the world. 235 That database will
soon grow even faster. Not only will police continue to take and preserve
but they will now take and
samples from anyone charged with a crime,
23s
preserve samples from mere arrestees.
While it may be normatively justifiable to construct a database solely
of those convicted of crimes based on known rates of recidivism and the
forfeiture of rights, no similar justification exists for retaining samples
from mere arrestees. Moreover, notions of common fairness dictate that
a better system would utilize an all-inclusive database to which everyone
was required to contribute. If such a system were proposed, it would

230. Sue Clough, World first for police as relative's DNA traps lorry driver's killer,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 20, 2004, at 6; Killer caught by relative's DNA, BBC
NEWS, Apr. 19,2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/l/hi/england/3640119.stm. Harman's
target was a sports car that was fortunately able to swerve out of the brick's path. Bird,
supra note 237.
231. Six months of investigation and a £25,000 reward had not lead to the killer. Bird,
supra note 229.
232. "[T]wo people chosen at random are likely to share six or seven markers, but 11
or more suggests a blood relative." The Sins of the Rathers-DNA Fingerprinting,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 2004, at 60.
233. Bird, supra note 229. Scientists estimated the probability of the blood on the brick
not coming from Craig Harman at one in a billion. Id.
234. Id.
235. Falloon, supra note 229. Police have solved at least two other murders using the
technique, including one for which three persons had been falsely convicted of the crime.
See Bird, supra note 229.
236. Falloon, supra note 229. At least four states, Texas, Louisiana, Virginia, and
California now require DNA samples be taken from certain arrestees, and Congress is
considering a similar measure. See Mark Hansen, DNA Dragnet, 90 ABA J. 37, 43 (May
2004); Eric Slater, State Lends a Strong Hand to Crime.Fighting with DNA, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2004, at Al. In such jurisdictions, uniform applicability is certainly preferable in
order to avoid racial or other profiling and sham arrests designed to gather DNA samples.
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benefit from the spirited dialogue that would no doubt result from any
program in which those in power must participate. Further, if it were
nonetheless implemented, it would enjoy a democratic legitimacy. Its
use would then be relatively uncontroversial, unlike current DNA
dragnets in which there are allegations of police threatening and
berating individuals into giving "voluntary" DNA samples."'
The same is true if local police decide to conduct thermal scans of
homes or millimeter wave scans of persons in a public place. If police
provide advanced notice of their intentions and apply the technique in
a broad and uniform manner, concerned citizens with the resources to
resist such a program are likely to seek political redress. In the words
of William Stuntz, "spreading the cost of policing through a larger slice
of the population ...reduces the odds of voters demanding harsh and

intrusive police tactics secure in the knowledge that those tactics will be
applied to others."238 We witnessed this phenomenon in the demise of
the Pentagon's proposed Total Information Awareness project: it had
uniform applicability, individuals thereby subjected to the program cried
foul, and Congress terminated the program.239
A court's determination of whether an intrusion is reasonable should
include these factors of public vetting and broad applicability. If
"expectations of privacy ...

must have a source outside of the Fourth

Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society,"24 ° surely those "understandings" include proposals that have
been publicly vetted and, ideally, democratically enacted. While a
dislike of general warrants, and therefore, a preference for individualized
suspicion, is rooted in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,2 4' in
some contexts broad applicability may be preferable.
During the 1980s the public schools in Vernonia, Oregon, witnessed a
dramatic increase in disciplinary actions and other disruptions, which
school officials attributed to an endemic drug culture led by student
athletes. When various initiatives failed to alleviate the problem, the
school district considered implementing a drug testing program and held

237. See Hansen, DNA Dragnet, supra note 236, at 38; Pam Bullock, To Try to Net a
Killer, Police Ask a Small Town's Men for DNA, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005.
238. Stuntz, Local Policing, supra note 228, at 2166.
239. A system for prescreening airline passengers dubbed CAPPS II recently suffered
a similar fate, despite government spending of over $100 million on its planning. See Mimi
Hall & Barbara DeLollis, Plan to Collect FlierData Canceled, USA TODAY, July 15, 2004,
at 1A.
240. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
241. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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a parent "input night" to discuss requiring mandatory drug testing for
all students participating in interscholastic athletics. The parents in
attendance were unanimously in favor, and a drug testing program was
implemented beginning in the fall of 1989.242 When seventh-grader
James Acton was denied the chance to play football based on his refusal
to submit to testing, his family sued, alleging a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.24 3
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 2 " the Court held the policy
was constitutional. 245 The Court found several reasons to favor a
suspicionless, uniform regime, including the accusatory nature of
suspicion-based testing and the risk of invidious discrimination in
selecting test subjects.246 The Court stated, "In many respects, we
think, testing based on 'suspicion' of drug use would not be better, but
worse."247 Thus, the Court has recognized that there are contexts in
which broad, uniform application is more reasonable than that based
upon individualized suspicion.245
With regard to the public vetting of the school district policy, the
Court had this to say:
We may note that the primary guardians of Vernonia's schoolchildren
appear to agree. The record shows no objection to this districtwide
program by any parents other than the couple before us here-even
though, as we have described, a public meeting was held to obtain

242. Id. at 648-50. The policy included both a mandatory test at the beginning of the
season and random testing thereafter. See id. at 650.
243. Id. at 651.
244. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
245. Id. at 664-65.
246. Id. at 667.
247. Id. at 664. The Court's other reasons for favoring uniform testing were the
likelihood of lawsuits alleging discriminatory treatment under a suspicion-based regime
and a hesitancy to add another non-instructional duty for teachers. Id. at 663-64.
248. Three Justices strongly disagreed:
In justifying this result, the Court dispenses with a requirement of individualized
suspicion on considered policy grounds. First, it explains that precisely because
every student athlete is being tested, there is no concern that school officials might
act arbitrarily in choosing whom to test. Second, a broad-based search regime, the
Court reasons, dilutes the accusatory nature of the search. In making these policy
arguments, of course, the Court sidesteps powerful, countervailing privacy
concerns. Blanket searches, because they can involve thousands or millions of
searches, pose a greater threat to liberty than do suspicion-based ones, which
affect one person at a time.
Id. at 667 (O'Connor, Stevens, Souter, JJ., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An exhaustive analysis of how and when broad applicability is superior to individualized
suspicion, which will have to await another paper, must take into account the many
arguments of Justice O'Connor. See id. at 667-84.
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parents' views. We find insufficient basis to contradict the judgment
of Vernonia's parents, its school board, and the District Court, as to
what was reasonably in the interest of these children under the
circumstances.249
The Court reiterated these principles in a more recent decision holding
constitutional a drug testing policy adopted by a school district in
Tecumseh, Oklahoma, which required drug testing not only for student
athletes but for all those participating in competitive extracurricular
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion strongly advocates
activities."'
public vetting:
When trying to resolve this kind of close question involving the
interpretation of constitutional values, I believe it important that the
school board provided an opportunity for the airing of these differences
at public meetings designed to give the entire community "the
opportunity to be able to participate" in developing the drug policy.
The board used this democratic, participatory process to uncover and
to resolve differences, giving weight to the fact that the process, in this
instance, revealed little, if any, objection to the proposed testing
program.251
While the Court has therefore recognized democratic vetting and broad
application as favoring reasonableness in the "special needs" context of
the public school,25 2 it has been less amenable to the concept in the
realm of ordinary crime control. Despite previously allowing uniform
automobile checkpoints to be used for intercepting illegal aliens5 3 and
combating drunk driving2 54 (and implying they could be used for
verifying license and registration 255 ), in Indianapolis v. Edmond,25

249. Id. at 665.
250. Board of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825-26, 837 (2002). "Competitive"
extracurricular activities include the Academic Team, Future Farmers of America, Future
Homemakers of America, band, choir, pom-pom, cheerleading, and athletics. Id. at 826.
251. Id. at 841. Justice Breyer also joined the majority opinion, and believed his
concurrence was "consistent with the Court's opinion." Id. at 839.
252. See id. at 829-30. The Court uses the term "special needs" to refer to those
situations in which there is a purpose "other than the normal need for law enforcement,"
such as highway safety or keeping school children off of drugs. See Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001).
253. See generally United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
254. See generally Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
255. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding unconstitutional a
discretionary license and registration stop but implying a uniform roadblock for the same
purpose would be constitutional). See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38 (2000)
("[Iun Delaware v. Prouse we suggested that a similar type of roadblock with the purpose
of verifying drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations would be permissible.") (internal
citation omitted). Thus, once again a system of uniform applicability can sometimes be
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the Court struck down a program of uniform checkpoints designed to
interdict drugs. 257 The Court "decline[d] to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a
checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating
crimes. ' As DNA databanks, data mining, thermal scans, and other
technologies develop, the Supreme Court would be wise to reconsider
this limitation. Whether the government need is crime control or
automobile safety, those intrusions that are uniformly applied and
publicly vetted are more likely to be reasonable.
3. Use Limitations. We have already discussed the limited third
party doctrine, which in effect requires police to avert their "technologically-enhanced" eyes from information otherwise provided. The Supreme
Court has also recognized that the programmatic purpose of a search
may determine its constitutionality, meaning that for searches not based
upon individualized suspicion and probable cause, the constitutionality
of the search may depend upon its purpose." 9
One such search with which we are all familiar is the searching of
carry-on baggage of those boarding an airplane. In the words of Judge
Kozinski, writing for the Ninth Circuit, "[wihile narrowly defined
searches for guns and explosives are constitutional as justified by the
need for air traffic safety, a generalized law enforcement search of all
passengers as a condition for boarding a commercial aircraft would
plainly be unconstitutional."26 ° Therefore, an airport screener's search
violated the Fourth Amendment when, pursuant to a policy guaranteeing
a $250 bounty, he informed the Customs Service that a certain

more reasonable. Justice Rehnquist humorously referred to this as a jurisprudence of
"misery loves company." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 664 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
256. 531 U.S. at 32 (2000).
257. Id. at 44.
258. Id. Readers familiar with Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. at 276
(discussed supra note 202) may think the five-member majority's refusal to rely on trade
secret law, which has been publicly vetted and democratically adopted, to similarly reflect
a hesitancy to consider political process checks in the reasonableness determination. The
majority in Dow Chemical, however, did not reject this principle but instead rejected
reliance on trade secret law because it was substantively irrelevant given the facts sub
judice (trade secret law does not forbid all photography-for example it has nothing to say
about a non-competitor taking photographs for personal enjoyment). See Dow Chemical,
476 U.S. at 239 n.6. Moreover the four dissenters relied on that law. See id. at 248-249
(Powell, J., dissenting in part).
259. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45-46 ("[P]rogrammatic purposes may be relevant to the
validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme
without individualized suspicion.").
260. United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1989).
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passenger was carrying a large amount of currency.261 The Ninth
Circuit was not willing, however, to restrict the use of information
obtained in airport searches that were not tainted by such improper
motivation:
Nothing we say today precludes [screeners] from reporting information
pertaining to criminal activity, as would any citizen. We see the
matter as materially different where the communication is undertaken
pursuant to an established relationship, fostered by official policy, even
more so where the communication is nurtured by the payment of
monetary rewards. The line we draw is a fine one but, we believe, one
that has constitutional significance.262
That line is not, however, mandated by the Fourth Amendment. As
Harold Krent has argued, "the reasonableness of a seizure extends to the
uses that law enforcement authorities make of property and information."263 Thus, if police wish to conduct a technologically-enhanced
search, the proposed uses of information so obtained should factor into
the reasonableness inquiry.
In accepting Vernonia's drug testing policy, the Court first recognized
that
[t]he other privacy-invasive aspect of urinalysis is, of course, the
information it discloses concerning the state of the subject's body, and
the materials he has ingested. In this regard it is significant that the
tests at issue here look only for drugs, and not for whether the student
is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.2
But it is not only relevant what information the government obtains, but
also what the government does with that information. In Vernonia "the
results of the tests [were] disclosed only to a limited class of school
personnel who ha[d] a need to know; and they [were] not turned over to
law enforcement authorities or used for any internal disciplinary
function ....
Accordingly, . 2.. 5 [the Court determined] the invasion of
privacy [was] not significant."
Likewise, in accepting Tecumseh's policy, the Court considered
relevant that

261.

Id. at 1241, 1248.

262. Id. at 1247 n.7.
263. Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 51 (1995).
264. The first privacy-invasive aspect being collection of the sample. See Vernonia, 515
U.S. at 658.
265. Id. at 658-60.
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[t]he Policy clearly requires that the test results be kept in confidential
files separate from a student's other educational records and released
to school personnel only on a "need to know" basis .... Moreover, the
test results are not turned over to any law enforcement authority. Nor
do the test results here lead to the imposition of discipline or have any
academic consequences .... Given the minimally intrusive nature of
the sample collection and the limited uses to which the test results are
put, we
conclude that the invasion of students' privacy is not signifi2 66
cant.

The Court has similarly determined an intrusion was unreasonable
because its fruits were used for criminal prosecution. In Ferguson v.
City of Charleston,267 a public hospital, in conjunction with local
prosecutors and police, designed a program to test expectant mothers for
drug use.268 If a woman tested positive, she would be threatened with
prosecution in order to "provide the necessary 'leverage' to make the
[plolicy effective." 269 Despite the Court's past acceptance of suspicionless drug testing and traffic checkpoints, the Court held the program
unconstitutional because the search results were conveyed to law
enforcement.2 70
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, critiqued this consideration of the use of a search's
fruits."'
But as technologically-enhanced intrusions become more

266. Earls,536 U.S. at 833-34.
267. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
268. Id. at 70-73. Although it was the hospital that initially contacted the local
prosecutor, the prosecutor played the central role in developing the policy. See id. at 71.
269. Id. at 72 (quoting brief for City of Charleston). According to the initial policy, a
patient testing positive after labor should be arrested. The policy was modified to provide
an opportunity to avoid arrest by consenting to substance abuse treatment whether the
drug use was detected during the pregnancy or following labor. Id.
270. Id. at 82-84. At least the program would be unconstitutional absent informed
consent, which was not decided below; the Court remanded for consideration of this issue.
See id. at 73-76, 77 n.11. In the words of the concurrence, "[the traditional warrant and
probable-cause requirements are waived in our previous cases on the explicit assumption
that the evidence obtained in the search is not intended to be used for law enforcement
purposes." Id. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The previous cases were Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989) (allowing drug testing for railway
employees involved in train accidents); Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 679 (1989) (allowing drug testing for U.S. Customs Service employees seeking
promotion to certain positions); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 646 (allowing drug testing for
student athletes) (discussed supra note 248); and Chandlerv. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322-23
(1997) (striking down drug testing for candidates for state office).
271. Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's strident argument in dissent
made his authorship of Kyllo somewhat surprising:
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commonplace and more invasive, this distinction could play an important
role in determining Fourth Amendment reasonableness. While an
intrusion is nonetheless made-a search takes place and the information
is obtained-the ideal balance in a dangerous world may require a
"Chinese wall" between those who engage in certain surveillance and
routine law enforcement. While our privacy is surely invaded by
government agents scanning persons or homes to prevent a terrorist
attack or to protect a passing dignitary, it nonetheless might be more
reasonable if they agree not to share that information with those
pursuing ordinary law enforcement ends.272
VII.

NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN?

As Lawrence Lessig has developed, there are both legal and technological constraints on government action.2 73 The framers of the Constitution only had to be concerned with those intrusions that were technologically convenient in their day, and thus, the Supreme Court first
interpreted the command of the Fourth Amendment to be tied to
trespass. But fortunately the constitutional command chosen by the
framers-that people be free from unreasonable searches-is a flexible
one that allows courts to continue to protect privacy as we transition
into a world in which no intrusion is technologically inconvenient.
The REP test must be limited to reign in its third party doctrine.
Without external restraint, technology will lead to an expectation of no
privacy, and police practice will incorporate that technology to create a
reality of no privacy. Although legislation is always welcome in this
area, and is crucial when it comes to protecting our privacy vis-A-vis
each other,274 it is the responsibility of the courts to define our rights
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment in a deliberate fashion.
Restricting the third party doctrine to information deliberately conveyed

Until today, we have never held-or even suggested-that material which a person
voluntarily entrusts to someone else cannot be given by that person to the police,
and used for whatever evidence it may contain. Without so much as discussing
the point, the Court today opens a hole in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
the size and shape of which is entirely indeterminate.
Id. at 95. Kyllo forbids police from using information provided to everyone, at least in the
context of the home. See supra note 175.
272. Of course what uses are reasonable will have to depend on what information is
discovered, thus, tying into the recognition that the magnitude of the underlying crime is
also relevant to reasonableness. Police discovering a kidnapping victim could not be
required to ignore that discovery under any rational or respectable system.
273. Lessig, Reading the Constitution, supra note 18, at 870.
274. The Fourth Amendment does not restrict non-government actors.
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in order that its content be used is a necessary step in preventing the
Fourth Amendment from becoming irrelevant.
The aims of the Fourth Amendment would be even better served if the
Supreme Court would jettison its outmoded REP criterion and return to
the text of the Amendment, considering only whether a search is
reasonable under the circumstances. While a broad consideration of
those circumstances, including magnitude of crime, political process
checks, and use controls, may sometimes lead away from historical
concerns such as the fear of general warrants, the command of the
Fourth Amendment is better served by adapting to changing circumstances than tenaciously hanging onto the past." 5 Just like time,
technology waits for no one, and the Fourth Amendment must once
again heed its call.

275. Moreover, such inclusion will provide courts with criteria to determine
reasonableness when they might otherwise struggle to understand a given technology. See
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in New Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths and The
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 799 (2004) (contrasting a court's relatively limited
ability to educate itself about a given technology with that of a legislature).

